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The Managed Care Dilemma: Can 

Theories of Tort Liability Adapt to 

the Realities of Cost Containment? 

by Barbara A. Noah" 
I. INTRODUCTION 
During the past decade, the United States health care system has 
undergone a transformation from a market comprised mainly of self­
employed physicians· in solo or small group practices to one in which far 
fewer physicians engage in this type of independent practice.! More 
than three quarters of the physicians in this country now practice 
medicine within some form of managed care organization ("MCO") or see 
some managed care patients.2 "Managed care" is a term used to 
describe a variety of organizations that control costs and utilization of 
health care services through techniques such as using physicians as 
"gatekeepers" for hospitalization and specialists and requiring prepay­
ment by subscribers for services.3 The rate of patient enrollment in 
MCOs continues to increase rapidly, with approximately sixty million 
Americans currently enrolled in health maintenance organizations 
("HMOs") and another ninety million in other types of managed care 
'" Adjunct Professor, Health Care Law, University of Florida College of Law and College 
of Health Professions. Union College (B.A., 1987); Harvard Law School (J.D., 1990). I 
would like to thank Lars Noah for his helpful comments. 
1. See BARRY R. FuRRow ET AL., HEALTH LAw 97 (Supp. 1995) (noting that, as late as 
1987, more than half of U.S. physicians were in such practices but that the figure had 
fallen to just 37% by 1993). 
2. See GENIE JAMES, MAKING MANAGED CARE WORK 93 (1997). 
3. See PHYsICIANS IN MANAGED CARE: A CAREER GUIDE 22 (Mark A. Bloomberg & 
Steven R. Mohlie eds., 1994) (defining "managed care" as a system "with the objective of 
influencing and changing the behavior of providers and of patients ... in order to affect 
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plans.4 Estimates suggest that if enrollment continues at the current 
rate, eight out of ten Americans will receive care from some sort of Mea 
by the year 2000.5 
Not surprisingly, as growing numbers of patients receive health care 
services from MCOs, criticisms have proliferated about the quality of 
care provided by these organizations. In the past few years, HMOs in 
particular have faced escalating consumer and physician complaints 
about the effects of cost-cutting on patient care. The public increasingly 
perceives the care provided through MCOs as inferior to traditional fee­
for-service care.6 Responding to constituent pressures, legislatures in 
more than twenty states recently have considered bills regulating 
managed care practices,7 and Congress ha~ now taken up the issue.s 
Even some employers who offer access to managed care plans as part of 
their benefits packages have begun to scrutinize HMOs more closely.9 
4. See Robert Pear, Laws Won't Let H.M.O.'s Tell Doctors What to Say, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 17, 1996, at A12. Other reports estimate that enrollment in HMOs is growing at the 
rate of nearly 500,000 persons per month. Robert Pear, Elderly and Poor Do Worse Under 
H.M.O. Plans' Care, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1996, at AI0. 
5. See PRIVATE SECTOR ADVOCACY AND SUPPORT TEAM, AM. MED. Ass'N, MANAGED 
CARE AND THE MARKET: A SUMMARY OF NATIONAL TRENDS AFFECTING PHYSICIANS 2 (1995) 
(noting that approximately 40% of Americans are enrolled in either HMOs or PPOs and 
estimating that the rate of enrollment would increase 10-15% annually during the next 
several years); see also Ellyn Spragins, Does Your HMO Stack Up?, NEWSWEEK, June 24, 
1996, at 56 (reporting that enrollment in HMOs has climbed from 6 million in 1976 to 53.3 
million in 1995 and is projected to reach 103.2 million by 2000). 
6. Recent widespread publicity about HMO cost·control methods has led to a public 
perception that the quality ofcare delivered by these organizations, or by their physicians, 
is substandard compared with fee·for-service care. See Stuart Auerbach, Managed Care 
Backlash: As Marketplace Changes, Consumers are Caught in the Middle, WASH. POST., 
June 25, 1996, at Z12 (discussing study reporting that 53% of respondents felt that the 
healthcare system was getting worse while only 38% believed it was improving). 
7. See George Anders & Laura Johannes, Doctors Are Losing a Lobbying Battle to 
HMOs, WALL ST. J., May 15, 1995, at Bl; see also Bruce D. Platt & Lisa D. Stream, 
Dispelling the Negative Myths of Managed Care: An Analysis of Anti·Managed Care 
Legislation and the Quality ofCare Provided by Health Maintenance Organizations, 23 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 489, 493·98 (1995) (discussing anti·managed care legislation). 
8. See Robert Pear, Congress Weighs More Regulation on Managed Care, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 10, 1997, at AI, All (discussing congressional consideration of legislation to protect 
consumers of managed care services). 
9. See Steve Sakson, HMOs Face Restrictive Legislation, GAINESVILLE SUN, Mar. 15, 
1996, at lA, 6A. Although large corporations strongly support managed care because of 
its cost efficiency, several corporations have implemented measures to make MCOs more 
accountable for quality of care. These measures include ranking the HMOs available to 
employees, discounting monthly premiums for those employees who select the highly 
ranked providers, and demanding statistical information about effectiveness of care for a 
variety of diseases. See id. 
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Disputes persist about the quality of care delivered by HMOs and 
other managed care providers.10 Critics argue that MCOs will overuse 
cost-cutting methods and thus provide inferior care to pocket greater 
profits.11 In an effort to contain costs, MCOs undeniably make 
decisions that affect the quality of care, but health care costs cannot 
continue rising without limitation. Government or private insurance can 
no longer pay for all medically beneficial treatments for covered 
individuals without risking bankruptcy.12 Health care costs now 
account for nearly fourteen percent of the country's Gross Domestic 
Product, and this percentage will likely continue to increase. 13 Medical 
spending increased at an average annual rate of 4.8% from 1960 to 
1993.14 The shift to managed care has magnified dramatically the 
competing exigencies of quality care and cost control. 
10. New industry-wide data became available under voluntary standards developed by 
the National Committee for Quality Assurance ("NCQA"), which recently called for HMOs 
to collect and disclose quality of care data. The NCQA is asking HMOs to disclose 
information such as whether patients with severe heart disease receive a class of effective 
medications known as beta-blockers, whether health plans actively advise members to quit 
smoking, how well HMOs follow-up patients with abnormal pap smears and mammograms, 
and how well HMOs work to prevent pneumonia in HIV-positive patients. See George 
Anders, New Rules Press HMOs to Disclose Data: Quality Panel's Standards Cover the 
Treatment ofCancer Coronaries, WALL ST. J., July 16,1996, at A3, A4. After a comment 
period, the standards went into effect in the fall of 1996 and allow consumers and 
employers to compare plans more effectively. See id.; George Anders, Polling Quirks Give 
HMOs Healthy Ratings, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 1996, at Bl (noting that "artful" polling 
techniques can improve an HMO's member satisfaction scores). 
11. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Pedroza, Cutting Fat or Cutting Corners, Health Care Delivery 
and Its Respondent Effect on Liability, 38 ARIz. L. REV. 399, 411 (1996) ("[T]he incentive 
structure created is for the MCO to use fewer resources per patient as a means of realizing 
a greater profit . . .. When phYSicians are pressured into underutilization, there is a 
danger that the quality of care provided will fall below the legally required standard."). 
12. See JAMES, supra note 2, at 25 ("The daunting challenge facing the healthcare 
industry today is to identify the means to manage the transition and stay financially viable 
...."). 
13. See BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE 
UNITED STATES: 1996 (116th ed. 1996), at 111; see also Health-Care Prognosis, Bus. WK., 
Apr. 7, 1997, at 8 (estimating that health care expenditures will constitute 18% of the 
Gross Domestic Production by the year 2005). 
14. See Edgar A. Peden & Mark S. Freeland. A Historical Analysis ofMedical Spending 
Growth, 1960-1993, HEALTH AFF., Sum. 1995, at 235 (noting also that the overall growth 
during this period was 373% in real per capita medical spending). Factors such as 
insurance coverage elasticities and demographic factors such as age, gender, and income 
growth explain only part of this rate of increase, and the increased capability and 
availability of medical technology accounts for a sizeable portion of the remainder. See id. 
at 235-36. 
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Notwithstanding the rapid and substantial transformation of the 
American health care market, the American legal system has acknowl­
edged only gradually the advent of these fundamental changes, 
especially the tensions that exist between managed care and the 
traditional view of medicine in the context of medical malpractice 
litigation. Those who perceive a conflict between the existing malprac­
tice standard and the need for cost containment tend to assume that cost 
control necessarily results in a deviation from the traditional medical 
standard of care. In the past several years, courts have held MCOs 
liable for medical malpractice akin to the corporate and vicarious 
liability of hospitals. As courts continue to develop and expand different 
theories for the imposition of such liability, MCOs will have to grapple 
with the financial consequences of ever-escalating tort claims while 
attempting to contain the costs of providing health care to their 
members. 
Although valid criticisms have been leveled against the quality of care 
delivered by MCOs, recourse to the courts may not provide the optimum 
solution to the problem. In fact, the imposition of tort liability on MCOs 
fundamentally challenges the health care philosophy underlying 
managed care. These organizations evolved in part as a response to the 
growing scarcity and spiraling costs of medical resources. Individuals 
seeking both preventive and acute health care understandably desire the 
best available technology and the most thorough treatment protocols, but 
it is difficult to reconcile those preferences with managed care's goal of 
containing costs while providing access to a reasonable standard of care 
for a diverse patient population. If courts increasingly hold MCOs liable 
for the effects of their cost-containment measures, it will become more 
difficult for these organizations to provide wide and relatively inexpen­
sive access to health care services. 
Part II of this Article provides a brief description of the different types 
of managed care organizations and explores the philosophy of managed 
care, particularly regarding cost containment. Part III canvasses the 
different theories for imposing liability on MCOs for the effects of cost­
containment measures as well as for the malpractice of their physicians. 
Part N considers problems associated with the imposition of tort 
liability, and Part V suggests alternatives to tort liability and explores 
the ethical implications of reforms that exclude corporate liability 
altogether. Ultimately, this Article concludes that managed care 
organizations should receive statutory immunity from malpractice suits 
so long as government officials meaningfully regulate the delivery of 
health care services by these entities. 
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II. EMERGENCE OF THE MANAGED CARE INDUSTRY 
To assess the consequences of imposing tort liability on MCOs, one 
must first understand their basic structure. Managed care organizations 
include HMOs and other "alternative" health care delivery systems that 
differ in structure from traditional fee-for-service care.16 Although this 
discussion will focus on' HMOs, the descriptions below include some of 
the less common forms of MCOs as well. 
A. Varieties ofManaged Care Organizations 
A number of alternative delivery systems have developed to allow for 
more effective management of health care. Each of these organizations 
differs in some way from the traditional fee-for-service mode of delivery 
in which patients or their insurers pay independently practicing 
physicians a separate fee for each visit or service. Managed care 
organizations vary in their degree of integration, ranging from simple 
associations of physicians to joint ventures between physicians and 
hospitals and, at the extreme end of the scale, to HMOs that fully 
integrate the insurance and provider aspects of health care delivery. 
Generally, HMOs enroll subscribers who prepay a set fee in exchange 
for both primary care and hospital-based acute care over a certain period 
of coverage. IS The enrollment fee remains set regardless of the actual 
costs of the services utilized by any individual subscriber. HMOs 
contract with participating physicians to provide office-based primary 
care and with hospitals to provide acute care. Thus, HMOs function as 
both insurers and health care providers.17 
HMO structures vary, but most health maintenance organizations fit 
into one of three basic models. In the "staff" model, the HMO directly 
employs its physicians, who work in a centralized care facility and 
receive salaries from the HMO.ls In the "group" model, physicians form 
a partnership or corporation that in tum contracts with the HMO to 
deliver health care to the organization's subscribers. Physicians in the 
15. See Diana J. Bearden & Bryan J. Maedgen, Emerging Theories ofLiability in the 
Managed Health Care Industry, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 285, 288-89 (1995) (noting that "[t]hese 
systems have become so much a part of the mainstream of health care delivery that it is 
now out-of-date to refer to them as 'alternative'''). 
16. See DONALD K. FREEBORN & CLYDE R. POPE, PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE IN 
MANAGED CARE: THE PREPAID GROUP PRACTICE MODEL 20-21 (1994). 
17. See id. at 20 ("The HMO assumes at least part ofthe financial risk in the provision 
of services. "). 
18. See id. at 20-23; see also Kate T. Christensen, Ethically Important Distinctions 
Among Managed Care Organizations, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 223, 224 (1995). 
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group, acting as independent contractors for the HMO, care for HMO 
members at the group's health care facility in exchange for a fixed 
monthly fee for each enrollee. 19 The group collects these "capitated" 
fees from the HMO and pays its physicians a base salary and bonuses, 
usually structured as financial incentives of some sort.20 Finally, in the 
"independent practice association" ("IPA") model, an independent 
physician group, usually a partnership or corporation comprised of 
independent practicing physicians, contracts on behalf of its members to 
provide services for the HMO. In the IPA model, physicians practice in 
their own separate facilities and often continue to practice outside of the 
HMO. The HMO pays the IPA a capitation fee, and the IPA then 
compensates the participating physicians based on separate contracts 
between the IPA and the individual physicians.21 As explained more 
fully below, health maintenance organizations also vary dramatically in 
their methods of risk sharing, utilization review, and internal manage­
ment. 
The various HMO models represent the most common types of 
organizations that deliver managed care, but other managed care 
entities are becoming more common as well. For example, IPAs also 
negotiate payment contracts with other types of insurers to provide care 
and then pay their member physicians on a fee-for-service basis. 
Member physicians frequently practice independently outside of their 
IPAs or join multiple IPAs. Although some IPAs simply negotiate with 
insurers, others may also engage in utilization review, set practice 
standards, or engage in other administrative functions such as billing 
and purchasing for the group in order to reduce costS.22 
19. See FREEBORN & POPE, supra note 16, at 21; see also Christensen, supra note 18, 
at 225. 
20. See Christensen, supra note 18, at 224. 
21. See Bearden & Maedgen, supra note IS, at 293. 
22. See FuRRow, supra note I, at 98. A physician-hospital organization ("PHO") is 
comprised of a hospital and its affiliated physicians and, like the IPA, contracts with 
payors on behalf of its hospital and physician members. A PHO negotiates health plan 
contracts and in some instances undertakes utilization review, quality assurance, or 
credentialing of physicians. As with IPAs, some PHOs also attempt to centralize some of 
the management functions of the organization, and participating physicians typically 
continue to practice independently and maintain contracts with payors other than those 
affiliated with the PHO. Although the typical PHO is comprised of one hospital and its 
medical staff, some PHOs may be structured as joint ventures between hospitals and 
physician organizations such as IPAs or other large medical groups. Some PHOs are 
"open," that is, open to all of the hospital's affiliated physicians, while others are "closed," 
enabling the PHO to accept some physicians and exclude others from participation. See 
id. at 98-99. 
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Preferred provider organizations ("PPOs") negotiate fees with groups 
of providers, physicians or hospitals, often at discounted rates.23 In 
contrast to HMOs, PPOs generally contract to pay participating 
providers on a discounted fee-for-service rather than capitation basis.24 
Many PPO physicians maintain separate practices outside the organiza­
tion or participate in more than one PPO.25 Individual subscribers pay 
premiums to the PPO, and the organization reimburses participating 
hospitals and physicians for their services.26 Moreover, patients who 
subscribe to PPOs may visit nonaffiliated doctors, but the plans impose 
financial disincentives such as larger co-payments and deductibles when 
patients choose non preferred providers. 27 
B. The Cost·Containment Philosophy of Managed Care 
No matter what their form, managed care organizations seek to control 
costs by restricting how and where patients can seek medical treatment. 
MCOs employ a variety of cost-containment strategies, including reliance 
on primary care physicians to serve as gatekeepers for specialist care, 
reduced hospitalization through outpatient procedures, the use of drug 
formularies, rigorous prospective utilization review, and refusals to cover 
virtually any experimental therapies.28 In particular, HMOs seek to 
control the use of outside facilities and specialists because the overuse 
of such services would pose a threat to the fiscal stability of the HMO.29 
For this reason, the gatekeeper function of primary care physicians, who 
must evaluate . enrolled patients before determining the necessity of 
referrals to specialists, plays an essential role in keeping costs low. 
23. See FREEBORN & POPE, supra note 16, at 25·26. 
24. See Christensen, supra note 18, at 224. 
25. See id. (noting that "[b)ecause these physicians are still paid per service rendered, 
an inherent incentive arises to generate more health care costs by seeing patients more 
often and/or by ordering more tests and interventions"). 
26. See Bearden & Maedgen, supra note 15, at 297·98. 
27. See BARRY R. FuRROW ET AL., HEALTH LAw 723·24 (2d ed. 1991). 
28. See David Orentlicher, Paying Physicians More to Do Less: Financial Incentives to 
Limit Care, 30 RICH. L. REV. 155, 158·60 (1996). For an example of the last type of 
coverage limitation, see Certificate of Coverage for the State of Florida Employee's Group 
Insurance Program of the AvMed Health Plan (1996), at 52·53 (denying coverage for 
"experimental or investigational treatment," defined as including all drugs and medical 
devices that have not received approval for marketing by the Food and Drug Administra­
tion ("FDA"), treatments in any phase of FDA-monitored clinical investigations, and other 
treatments, therapies and devices if "[t)here is no consensus among practicing physicians 
that the treatment, therapy or device is safe or effective for the treatment in question"); 
see also Lars Noah, Constraints on the Off-Label Uses ofPrescription Drug Products, 16 J. 
PROD. & TOXICS LIAB. 139, 142·44 nn.10 & 18 (1994). 
29. .See Bearden & Maedgen, supra note 15, at 294. 
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Other common methods for reducing referrals include using maximum 
utilization quotas for referrals to outside services and withholding a 
percentage of the physicians' salaries in a risk pool to cover overuse of 
specialist services.30 Some MCOs also discourage or prohibit provider 
physicians from discussing noncovered treatment options with their 
patients, a practice that recently has attracted widespread criticism from 
physicians and government officials.31 
Financial incentives for physicians to limit patient care represent 
perhaps the most significant of these cost-containment measures. 
Alternative compensation methods to the traditional fee-for-service 
approach contain imbedded financial incentives to limit care.32 Because 
physicians will earn the same amount of money regardless of how much 
care they provide, both the salary and the capitation approach to 
compensation encourage physicians to limit the amount of care they 
deliver.33 Although salary and capitation may discourage excessive 
care, physicians may respond by altering the mix of services given to 
patients, increasing the number pf diagnostic procedures recommended, 
30. See id. at 294-95. 
31. President Clinton recently announced a federal policy restricting this practice 
among HMOs that treat Medicaid patients, and he urged Congress to adopt legislation 
extending this protection to all patients enrolled in managed care plans. See Laurie 
McGinley, Clinton to Prohibit Use of'Gag Clauses' Under Medicaid, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 
1997, at A22; Robert Pear, Clinton Prohibits H.M. O. Limit on Advice to Medicaid Patients, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1997, at 22 (noting that physicians who flouted rules discouraging 
them from discussing expensive treatments with patients have faced criticism and 
retaliation from the HMOs with which they are affiliated). The Department of Health and 
Human Services recently made a similar announcement concerning HMOs that receive 
Medicare funds, concluding that because Medicare HMO patients are entitled to all 
benefits available under Medicare, contracts limiting physicians' ability to discuss 
treatments with Medicare patients would violate federal law. See Robert Pear, U.S. Bans 
Limits on H.M.O. Advice Within Medicare, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1996, at AI. In 1996, 
sixteen states adopted laws barring HMOs from limiting what physicians can tell patients 
about potential treatments. See Pear, supra note 4, at A12. 
32. See Carolyn M. Clancy & Howard Brody, Managed Care: Jekyll or Hyde?, 273 
JAMA 338 (1995). Under traditional fee-for-service care, the financial incentive to 
overtreat also gives rise to patient complaints. though of a different nature. Although 
many patients in fee-for-service insurance plans are satisfied because they perceive more 
care as better care, some patients complain that the provider has delivered unnecessary 
care. See id. at 338-39; see also Natalie Angier, In a Culture of Hysterectomies, Many 
Question Their Necessity, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1997, at 1. 
33. See Orentlicher, supra note 28, at 159. "With capitation, physicians have an 
incentive to increase the number of patients for whom they ,have responsibility while, with 
salary, physicians have an incentive to reduce the number of patients for whom they have 
responsibility." Id. "Accordingly, salaried physicians are often assigned a certain number 
of patients for whom they are expected to provide care." Id. 
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or referring their patients to specialists or other providers of ancillary 
services.34 
Managed care organizations also have developed a separate system of 
financial incentives to discourage physicians from overutilizing 
diagnostic testing, specialists, and other services. In a typical bonus 
system, the MCO will create a pool of funds to pay for specialist care and 
other ancillary services; funds remaining in the pool at the end of the 
year supply bonuses to participating physicians.35 In a "fee withhold" 
system, the MCO withholds a percentage of each physician's pay and 
uses the proceeds to create a pool to pay for ancillary services; at the end 
of the year, physicians receive a share of any unspent funds. Under both 
arrangements, physicians understand that by using fewer ancillary 
services they can increase their earnings.36 Finally, in an expanded 
capitation system, the payor calculates the amount of the physician's 
capitation payment to cover some ancillary services and deducts the cost 
of referrals and other services from the physician's capitation income.37 
Managed care organizations undoubtedly have achieved their goal of 
reducing the costs of health care. Although some cost-containment 
strategies may backfire,38 others have proven to be quite effective,39 
and overall health care costs have declined. For example, some studies 
have shown that health maintenance organizations deliver care at a 
substantially lower annual cost per person than traditional fee-for­
34. See id. at 159-60. 
35. See id. at 159. 
36. See id. 
37. See id. (noting that "financial incentives to limit care discourage physicians from 
providing high levels of care by transferring from the health plan to the physician some of 
the financial risk of costly medical care"). 
38. A recent study suggested that the use of a formulary, an approved list of 
medications, by MCOs as a cost-containment measure results in an overall increase in 
patient costs over the long term.. The study, funded by six major HMOs and a drug 
industry group, assessed the impact of formulary restrictions on the treatment of more 
than 13,000 patients who were receiving care for asthma, ulcers, high blood pressure, 
arthritis, and ear infections. The study concluded that patients in HMOs with the fewest 
restrictions on access to prescription drugs incurred the lowest total health care costs, 
while patients in HMOs with strict formularies incurred substantially higher costs. See 
Ron Winslow, Limiting Drugs A Doctor Orders May Cost More, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 1996, 
at B1, B4. Some MCOs have shifted to drug budgets for each physician. See Laura 
Johannes, Some HMOs Now Put Doctors on a Budget for Prescription Drugs, WALL ST. J., 
May 23, 1997, at Al. 
39. For an early study of the effect of utilization review on length ofhospital stays, see 
Paul J. Feldstein et al., Private Cost Containment: The Effects of Utilization Review 
Programs on Health Care Use and Expenditures, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 13lO (1988) 
(concluding that utilization review reduced admission of health plan groups by 12.3%, 
reduced inpatient days by 8%, and reduced hospital expenditures by 11.9%). 
1228 MERCER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48 
service arrangements, and as a result, HMO plans cost subscribers 
substantially less than fee-for-service plans.4O There is also, however, 
some evidence that at least part of the comparative advantage of HMO 
plans results from favorable selection pattems.41 
Managed care's emphasis on cost containment raises troubling issues 
about the effect on the quality of care rendered to plan subscribers.42 
Low cost and a consequently broader access to health care provide little 
benefit to consumers unless the system can simultaneously maintain a 
reasonable s~dard of quality. Any effort to improve access and lower 
costs of care must address quality assurance issues.4s The complex 
task of evaluating the quality of health care involves consideration of a 
variety of factors including the nature of the services delivered, the 
selection and efficacy of those services, and the outcomes of these 
choices. Although overall quality of care seems most easily gauged by 
measuring therapeutic outcomes, outcome measures must be adjusted to 
compensate for variables such as factors extraneous to treatment that 
affect the patient's condition, difficulties in measuring some types of 
outcomes, and variations in outcomes that reflect the timing of the 
patient assessments." Both the traditional fee-for-service structure 
40. See Robert H. Miller & Harold S. Luft, Managed Care Plan Performance Since 1980: 
A Literature Analysis, 271 JAMA 1512, 1515 (1994) (concluding that, in 18 comparisons 
between managed care and indemnity plans in 9 different studies, HMOs utilized 22% 
fewer expensive procedures or treatments); see also Willard G. Manning et aI., A Contralled 
Trial of the Effect ofa Prepaid Group Practice on Use ofServices, 310 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1505 (1984). 
41. For example, because joining an HMO usually entails changing physicians, patients 
who are chronically ill or have some preexisting condition that has been treated by one 
physician for some time are less likely to switCh. Conversely, young, healthy persons who 
have not established a regular relationship with one physician are more likely to be 
attracted to the HMO's lower cost and will tend to utilize fewer of the HMO's resources. 
See Harold S. Luft & Robert H. Miller, Patient Selection in a Competitive Health Care 
System, HEALTH AFF., Sum. 1988, at 97; Ira Strumwasser et aI., The Triple Option Choice: 
Self-Selection Bias in Traditional Coverage, HMOs, and PPOs, 26 INQUIRY 432 (1989). 
42. See David M. Frankford, Managing Medical Clinicians' Work Through the Use of 
Financial Incentives, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 71 (1994) (attacking the use of financial 
incentives); Orentlicher, supra note 28, at 161 (noting that cost controls that give the 
physician a personal financial interest in limiting the care they provide to patients may 
result in, among other things, delays in tests and treatments, scheduling appointments at 
greater than ideal intervals, delays in referrals to specialists, and accelerated hospital 
discharges). 
43. See Emily Friedman, The Eternal Triangle: Cost, Access, and Quality, PHYSICIAN 
EXEC., July-Aug., 1991, at 3. 
44. See Vernellia Randall et a!., Section 1116 Medicaid Waivers: Critiquing the State 
Applications, 26 SETON HALL L. REv. 1069, 1110-12 (1996) (discussing the difficulties 
inherent in evaluating quality of care and suggesting that useful assessments ofcare must 
include consideration of the structures and processes by which care is delivered as well as 
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and the prepaid managed care structure create incentives that influence 
the choices physicians make in treating their patients.45 
Unless MCOs impose moderate financial incentives to encourage cost 
consciousness, physicians will continue to overutilize care, both as 
defensive medicine and -because the fee-for-service compensation system 
encourages them to do so. Ifcarefully controlled and used in conjunction 
with safeguards for patient welfare, financial incentives have the virtue 
of limiting the rise in health care costs while allowing physicians to 
continue to individualize patient care in a way that overall resource caps 
do not.46 Some studies have suggested that the quality of HMO care 
compares favorably to fee-for-service care.47 Many health care profes­
sionals believe that the HMO payment structure actually results in a 
better coordination of patient care because a single primary care 
outcomes). 
45. 	 One court explained: 
A health maintenance organization ... offers, for a fixed fee, as much medical care 
as the patient needs. Providers using traditional fee-for-service methods, by 
contrast, charge for each procedure. Each method creates an unfortunate 
incentive: a physician receiving a fee for each service has an incentive to run up 
the bill by furnishing unnecessary care, and an HMO has an incentive to skimp 
on care (once patients have signed up and paid) in order to save costs. Each 
incentive encounters countervailing forces: patients, or insurers on their behalf, 
resist paying the bills for unnecessary services. and HMOs must afford adequate 
care if they are to attract patients. HMOs also have a reason to deliver excellent 
preventive medicine. Prevention may reduce the need for costly services later. 
Competition among the many providers ofhealth care, and between the principal 
methods of charging for that care, affords additional protection to consumers. 
Anderson v. Humana, Inc., 24 F.3d 889, 890 (7th Cir. 1994). 
46. See id. at 891-92; see also Martin J. Hatlie, Professional Liability: The Case for 
Federal Reform, 263 JAMA 584 (1990) (estimating that the practice of defensive medicine 
costs nearly $12 billion annually in addition to the costs of necessary care); Mark A Hall, 
The Malpractice Standard Under Cost-Containment, 17 LAw MED. & HEALTH CARE 347, 
351 (1989) (noting that "defensive behavior ... occurs in a form that is completely in line 
with incentives created by traditional, fee-for-service insurance"). 
47. See Platt & Stream, supra note 7, at 501-09 (discussing multiple studies that 
demonstrate that HMOs provide care which is equal or better in quality to care provided 
via traditional fee-for-service models). For example, one 1995 study conducted a case-by­
case comparison between the treatment delivered by and the cost of the two types of 
systems and concluded that those patients treated by HMOs had similar results to those 
receiving care from traditional medical practices, despite the fact that the HMO care cost 
substantially less. See Sheldon Greenfield et aI., Outcomes ofPatients with Hypertension 
andNon-Insulin.Dependent Diabetes Mellitus Treated by Different Systems and Specialties: 
Results from the Medical Outcomes Study, 274 JAMA 1436 (1995) (focusing on diabetes and 
high blood pressure patients in Boston, Chicago, and Los Angeles). Critics of the study 
noted that much more data was needed than the results of one study of two diseases in 
three cities. See Study: HMO Care Equals That ofRegular Practices, GAINESVILLE SUN, 
Nov. 8, 1995, at 3A. 
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physician must con,sider and approve all medical treatment; in contrast, 
the traditional fee-for-service system arguably gave physicians a strong 
financial incentive to overtreat.48 Because they recognize that prevent­
ing illness costs less than treating it, HMOs strongly encourage 
preventive medicine.49 
III. EXPANSION OF MANAGED CARE TORT LIABILITY 
Patients have sued MCOs to recover damages for injuries allegedly 
caused by the denial -of benefits or services. Although many HMO 
contracts require patients to settle disputes through internal appeals or 
arbitration, more patients now seek redress in court with claims that 
HMO refusals to reimburse for certain types of care constitute malprac­
tice.50 Patients who experience bad outcomes under plans that employ 
cost-control strategies (like capitation) often attribute these bad 
outcomes to the MCO's emphasis on cost containment, and they argue 
that the plan's structure provides disincentives for quality care. Because 
managed care organizations frequently influence their physicians' 
delivery of care, some courts have held MCOs liable for injuries 
attributable to these cost-containment efforts. 51 
In these cases, courts must grapple with the question of whether the 
more conservative form of medical practice encouraged by most MCOs 
constitutes malpractice. The standard of care generally is defined in 
terms of what the average, reasonable, and prudent person would have 
done in the same or similar circumstances. 52 In many situations, there 
48. 	 See Christensen, supra note 18, at 226. The author elaborated as follows: 
The beneficial impact of managed care incentives include[s1 the reduction of 
wasteful treatments, less iatrogenic harm to patients by the avoidance of 
unnecessary tests and procedures, more emphasis on preventive care, the potential 
for better case management of very iII patients in an integrated setting, and cost 
savings. All of these benefits result in improvements in the quality of care under 
managed care. 
[d. (citations omitted). 
49. See Miller & Luft, supra note 40, at 1516 (noting that HMO enrollees receive more 
preventive care than patients in fee-for-service plans). In fact, some studies have indicated 
a high degree of patient satisfaction with the care that they have received from MCOs. 
See, e.g., Sakson, supra note 9, at lA, 6A. 
50. See Edward Felsenthal, When HMOs Say No to Health Coverage, More Patients Are 
Taking Them to Court, WALL ST. J., May 17, 1996, at B1 (noting a recent legislative 
proposal in New York to standardize the HMO decisionmaking process regarding medically 
necessary treatments and create a uniform patient appeals process). 
51. See CHARLES G. BENDA & FAY A. RozovSKY, MANAGED CARE AND THE LAw § 13.54 
(1996). 
52. See, e.g., Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 872-73 (Miss. 1985) (describing both the 
national standard and the locality rule). 
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is no uniform national standard of care, only a continuum of care that 
varies according to geographic location and patient population. 53 
Courts also recognize resource limitations in evaluating adherence to the 
standard of care, as when physicians practice in rural communities,54 
but these do not encompass limitations aimed at containing costs. To 
date, courts have not recognized a lower medical malpractice standard 
of care for MCOS.55 Ironically, advertising and promotional materials 
aimed at potential enrollees may provide evidence creating a heightened 
duty to provide services compared with that demanded by the general 
standard of care in medical malpractice. 56 
Within limits, MCOs can encourage the practice of cost-effective 
medicine by their physicians without breaching the broad standard of 
care and thus without raising malpractice issues. The malpractice 
standard of care and cost containment do not fundamentally conflict 
with one another; the more conservative style of medicine that MCOs 
encourage can remain within the rather elastic concept of the malprac­
53. See Hall, supra note 46, at 348. Professor Hall discusses a volume of work by 
medical epidemiologists that demonstrated a substantial variation in practice patterns 
(using examples of rates of tonsillectomies and hysterectomies) among different New 
England communities, noting that "in virtually every instance where researchers have 
studied medical procedures that involve any significant degree of judgment, they have 
found large variations in the frequency with which the procedure is employed for similar 
population groups, often several. fold variations." Id. As he notes, adhering to the 
approach of a "respectable minority" of practitioners does not constitute malpractice, and, 
"[i]f the existing legal standard is as broad as [the] evidence suggests, it can amply 
accommodate massive cutbacks in care within the tremendous variations in practice 
patterns that the established custom encompasses." Id. 
54. See, e.g., Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d at 873 ("[Wle have added to [the national 
standard of care) a pragmatic addendum by today's recognition that the physician's duty 
of care must take into consideration the quality and kind of facilities, services. equipment 
and other resources available."); Chapel v. Allison, 785 P.2d 204, 210 (Mont. 1990) (using 
similar reasoning). 
55. See Larry J. Pittman, ERISA's freemption Clause and the Health Care Industry: 
An Abdication of Judicial Law·Creating Authority, 46 FLA. L. REV. 355, 363·65 (1994) 
(discussing opposition to permitting physicians or hospitals to assert a cost defense to avoid 
liability for substandard medical treatment given to patients who cannot pay for better 
care). Courts can consult a variety of sources to determine the appropriate standard of 
care in a negligence lawsuit against a managed care organization. See BENDA & RosovsKY, 
supra note 51, at § 6.4 (suggesting, as sources, accreditation requirements, advertising or 
promotional materials, learned treatises, bylaws, clinical practice guidelines, contracts, 
expert witness testimony, journal articles, membership handbooks, and federal and state 
statutes and regulations). 
56. See BENDA & ROSOVSKY, supra note 51, at § 6.4.3 ("Ironically, had the managed 
care entity positioned itself to perform at a level of care recognized as commonplace and 
appropriate to the industry, the plaintiff would be less likely to prevail in a negligence 
suit."). 
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tice standard of care. 57 Because of the significant medical judgment 
involved in many decisions regarding treatment, studies have found 
large variations in the utilization rates of medical procedures among 
similar population groups. Yet the standard of care accommodates even 
several-fold variations in these utilization rates. 58 The standard of care 
partially recognizes resource limitations to accommodate variations in 
available physical facilities and equipment. 59 If courts recognize the 
full flexibility of the malpractice standard of care, MCOs could deliver 
a conservative style of health care without undue liability exposure. 
Courts have not, however. adopted this approach. 
In the last decade, patients have begun to succeed in pursuing tort 
claims against managed care organizations. In addition to direct 
liability. HMOs and other managed care organizations now face liability 
for the malpractice of their participating physicians under principles of 
vicarious liability. Courts have offered various rationales to justify 
imposing such organizational liability on MCOs: (1) the risk of liability 
will force them to protect profits by combining cost effectiveness with 
more emphasis on quality care; (2) plaintiffs will be able to identify the 
source or cause of their injuries more easily (promoting recovery and 
reducing judicial burdens); and (3) institutions provide a more depend­
able source of funds for compensating injured patients. 60 A brief 
overview of the different theories of direct and vicarious corporate 
liability suggests that the law in this area, as it has evolved to this 
57. See Hall, supra note 46, at 347 (arguing generally that the law as it currently exists 
"is perfectly capable of incorporating cost-sensitive medical decisions within its existing 
doctrinal framework"). 
58. See id. at 348-49 (discussing variations in local practice patterns and noting that 
even the so-called "national" standard of care requires only those medical practices that 
prevail in "the same or similar circumstances" as those of the defendant). 
59. Professor Mark Hall has argued that the rationale underlying this so-called "locality 
rule" amply supports its extension to the modern problem of financing care: 
The locality component of the malpractice standard arose because funding 
restrictions in rural areas had a detrimental effect on the numbers and quality of 
medical personnel locating in small towns and their ability to purchase and 
construct state-of-the-art equipment and· facilities. Likewise, it is funding 
restrictions that are pressuring health care providers in metropolitan areas to 
refrain from using their facilities to the fullest extent possible. Thus, while the 
precise form and content of modern responses to funding differentials may be 
different, the origins are precisely the same: insurance limitations. 
[d. at 350. 
60. See Barry R. Furrow, Enterprise Liability and Health Care Reform: Managing Care 
and Managing Risk, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 79, 110 (1994) {"Rather than focusing on the 
individual agent's (ault, as the courts must under the fault system, the enterprise could 
penalize the whole work group of which the agent is a part, restructure a work 
environment, or take other steps that transcend the responsibility of an individual agent. "). 
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point, has created an unpredictable and somewhat inefficient approach 
to addressing concerns about cost containment and other influences 
exerted by MCOs on the behavior of physicians. 
A. Direct Corporate Liability 
Initially, courts only reluctantly held MCOs directly liable for 
malpractice because they viewed managed care purely as a business 
arrangement with the organizations themselves facilitating but not 
actually delivering health care. The protection derived from this 
"corporate practice of medicine" doctrine is, however, fading. As courts 
began to recognize that MCO cost-containment strategies could have a 
direct influence on the quality of health care provided, their reluctance 
to hold MCOs liable in tort began to disappear. This turnabout parallels 
the shift that the courts previously bad made in recognizing the 
potential liability of hospitals in delivering health care services.s1 
Over the past decade, courts have applied theories of direct corporate 
liability to the alleged negligence of MCOs. In Wickline v. California,62 
one of the first cases to suggest the possibility of direct third-party payor 
negligence, plaintiff claimed that the decision of the state's Medi-Cal 
program to discharge her prematurely from the hospital after vascular 
surgery resulted in the amputation of her leg.63 Although the court 
found that the State had not departed from the standard of care in this 
case,54 it suggested that the payor implementing the cost-containment 
strategy should be held liable when cost-containment procedures result 
61. For example, in Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 
(Ill. 1965), the court reasoned that 
[t]he conception that the hospital does not undertake to treat the patient, does not 
U:ndertake to act through its doctors and nurses, but undertakes instead simply 
to procure them to act upon their own responsibility, no longer reflects the fact. 
Present-day hospitals, as their manner of operation plainly demonstrates, do far 
more than furnish facilities for treatment. 
Id. at 257 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court noted that a jury could conclude 
that the hospital itself was negligent in failing to review the work of the treating physician, 
which resulted in injury to the patient. Id. at 258; see also Fridena v. Evans, 622 P.2d 463 
(Ariz. 1980); Purcell v. Zimbelman, 500 P.2d 335 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972); Felice v. St. Agnes 
Hosp., 411 N.Y.S.2d 901 (App. Div. 1978); Bost v. Riley, 262 S.E.2d 391 (N.C. Ct. App.), 
cerl. denied, 269 S.E.2d 621 (N.C. 1980). 
62. 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Ct. App. 1986). 
63. See id. at 811. 
64. See id. at 818 (finding that the decision to discharge plaintiff from the hospital, 
rather than extending plaintiff's stay for an additional eight days, met the prevailing 
standard of care). 
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in a breach of the standard of care.6li In refusing to foreclose causes of 
action against third-party payors for medical malpractice, the Wickline 
decision sent a strong message to the managed care industry and opened 
the door to subsequent lawsuits against MCOs based on cost-contain­
ment theories of liability. Moreover, by suggesting that the physician 
had a duty to appeal his patient's case to the payor, the court made no 
attempt to adjust the treating physician's duty of care to reflect the fact 
that he was working within a cost-conscious system.66 
In Wilson v. Blue Cross,67 another California court suggested that a 
utilization review company could be liable to a patient if its conduct was 
a "substantial factor" in bringing about the injury.66 Howard Wilson, 
Jr., a subscriber to a Blue Cross managed care plan, admitted himself 
to a hospital for treatment of psychiatric problems. His physician 
recommended that Wilson remain as an inpatient for three to four 
weeks, but a utilization review firm employed by Blue Cross recommend­
ed that it refuse payment for more than eleven days of treatment. 
Shortly after being discharged from the hospital following a ten day stay, 
Mr. Wilson committed suicide, prompting his family to bring a wrongful 
death action against Blue Cross and the utilization review firm.69 The 
defendant utilization review organization unsuccessfully argued that 
public policy considerations favoring concurrent utilization review should 
alter the normal rules of tort liability.70 Although the court rejected 
the Wickline dicta as overbroad,71 it added that any "important public 
65. The court discussed at some length the potential liability of third-party payors for 
their cost-containment strategies: 
The patient who requires treatment and who is harmed when care which should 
have been provided is not provided should recover for the injuries suffered from 
all those responsible for the deprivation of such care, including, when appropriate, 
health care payors. Third party payors of health care services can be held legally 
accountable when medically inappropriate decisions result from defects in the 
design or implementation of cost containment mechanisms .... However, the 
physician who complies without protest with the limitations imposed by a third 
party payor. when his medical judgment dictates otherwise, cannot avoid his 
ultimate responsibility for his patient's care. 
[d. at 819. 
66. See Jonathan J. Frankel, Note, Medical Malpractice £alP and Health Care Cost 
Containment: Lessons for Reformers from the Clash ofCultures• 103 YALE L.J. 1297, 1306­
07 (1994). 
67. 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Ct. App. 1990). 
68. See id. at 885 ("[T]here is a triable issue as to whether the refusal to allow the 
decedent to stay in the hospital was a 'substantial factor' in bringing about his death."). 
69. See id. at 878, 881-82. 
70. See id. at 884. 
71. See id. at 885. The court also distinguished the holding in Wickline as limited to 
public insurers based on directives from the state legislature to fund the public health care 
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policy considerations" favoring utilization review did not justify a 
departure from the normal standard of tort liability.72 The court 
concluded that a jury could find that the termination of insurance 
coverage caused Wilson's death,73 but it failed to resolve the issue of 
what would constitute utilization review negligence by MCOs. 
Surprisingly few courts have examined the liability of MCOs for 
negligence based on the effects that cost-containment financial incentives 
have on medical decisions made by participating physicians. In one 
case, plaintiff sued her HMO to recover damages suffered from an 
alleged negligent failure to diagnose and treat her uterine cancer in a 
timely manner.74 The terms of the HMO contract required that 
plaintiff consult her primary care physician prior to being referred to a 
specialist.75 The court suggested that MCOs may face liability if their 
cost-containment methods contributed to the physician's malpractice.76 
In another case, plaintiff claimed that her HMO's cost-containment 
program. See id. at 878-80. 
72. See id. at 884; see also Allen D. Allred & Terry O. Tottenham, Liability and 
Indemnity Issues for Integrated DelilJery Systems, 40 ST. LoUIS U. L.J. 457, 461-62 (1996) 
(noting "the trend among courts to hold insurers accountable for the withholding of 
medically necessary care when defects in the design or implementation of a utilization 
review program caused the injury"). 
73. 	 The court stated: 
The sole reason for the discharge, based on the evidence adduced in connection 
with the summary judgment motion, was that the decedent had no insurance or 
money to pay for any further in-patient benefits. . .. [T]he decedent's treating 
physician believed that had the decedent completed his planned hospitalization 
that there was a reasonable medical probability that he would not have committed 
suicide. 
271 Cal. Rptr. at 883; see also Hughes v. Blue Cross, 263 Cal. Rptr. 850, 857-58 (Ct. App. 
1989) (finding that a plan's utilization denial rates greatly exceeded the industry average 
and that this deviation from the norm suggested noncompliance with the standard ofcare). 
74. See Bush v. Dake, No. 86-25767 NM-2 slip op. (Mich. Cir. Ct., Saginaw County, 
1989). 
75. See id. The plan paid participating providers on a capitation basis, and it also 
funded a "referral pool" that paid for specialist care as needed. Each referral of a plan 
subscriber to a specialist further depleted the pool, and, at the end of the year, the HMO 
and the physicians divided any remaining funds. See id. at 3-4. The court in Bush 
declined to second-guess the legislature, which had approved HMOs' use of financial 
incentives, risk sharing, and other techniques in order to contain health care costs, despite 
plaintiffs argument that the system violated public policy. See id. 
76. With regard to the claim that the HMO's use of financial incentives contributed to 
the malpractice, the court in Bush found that the HMO's system itself may have 
proximately contributed to the malpractice in the case and left the causation question for 
the jury. See id. While the case awaited appeal, the parties settled for an undisclosed 
sum. See Sharon M. Glenn, Comment, Tort Liability of Integrated Health Care DelilJery 
Systems: Beyond Enterprise Liability, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 305, 337 (1994). 
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practices resulted in a delay in the diagnosis of her cancer.77 Because 
the HMO structure did not tie the refund of the withheld fees to the 
number of referrals made by any individual physician, the court found 
no basis for imposing punitive damages on the physician for the injuries 
that resulted from the delayed diagnosis. 78 Very few plaintiffs have 
proceeded on this theory to date, but as enrollment in HMOs continues 
to grow, more of these suits may be filed. 
Although the managed care organization's ability to manage risk 
efficiently appears to favor shifting the locus of liability from the 
physicians to the organization, the benefits of centralized risk manage­
ment may not be as great in the MCO context as they appear at first 
glance. Certainly, hospitals are better able than their physicians to 
detect patterns of poor care and to improve overall quality. But, as one 
commentator has observed, "the new enterprises are both more complex 
and more diffuse than the traditional hospital. "79 The decentralization 
of the new integrated systems seriously weakens the supposed risk 
management benefits of imposing direct corporate liability while 
excluding individual providers from allliability.80 
77. See Sweede v. CIGNA Healthplan, 1989 WL 12608 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 2, 1989). 
The HMO contracted with an IPA on a capitation basis for the delivery of medical services, 
and it withheld 20% of each monthly payment in a performance risk pool. At the end of 
each twelve-month period, the HMO calculated the actual costs of the services provided, 
compared these costs with budgeted amounts, and returned the fees to the physicians only 
if the amount in the pool exceeded the budget. The total number of referrals to specialists 
made by the participating primary care physicians determined the profitability of the plan. 
The actual number of referrals made by any individual physician was not considered in the 
refund decision. See id. at "'1. 
78. See id. at *5. For an earlier example, see Pulvers v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 
160 Cal. Rptr. 392 (Ct. App. 1979). In this ease, the defendant HMO used financial 
incentives to discourage physicians from utilizing unnecessary treatments and diagnostic 
tests. See id. at 393-94. Plaintiffs sued on a fraud theory, alleging that defendant's 
representations about the high quality of care delivered by the plan were misleading. [d. 
at 393. The California Court of Appeal found nothing in the plan's procedures that 
encouraged physicians to act negligently or withhold tests or treatments in violation of the 
professional standard of care, 'and it noted further that the cost-eontainment incentives 
used by the plan were required by statute and supported by professional medical 
organizations. See id. at 394. Although the court considered the nature of the incentives 
themselves, the fact that the incentives were specifically authorized by statute seems to 
have been determinative. 
79. Furrow, supra note 60, at 124. 
80. See id. at 125 ("Peer review, peer pressure, and collegial forces are important 
sources of quality improvement by physicians, and such forces are more diffuse in loosely 
aligned medical groups within integrated networks."). . 
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B. Vicarious Liability 
Under settled principles of vicarious liability, MCOs can be held liable 
for the torts of their member physicians. The degree of control exercised 
by MCOs over health care personnel varies greatly,SI and the nature 
of the relationship between the managed care plan and its physicians 
will determine the extent of liability. When MCOs exert substantial 
control, some courts have held them vicariously liable for the negligence 
of their physicians.s2 
The doctrine of respondeat superior holds an employer liable for the 
wrongful or negligent acts of its employee provided that the acts 
occurred within the scope of the employment.s3 This vicarious liability 
depends on the existence of an employer-employee or closely analogous 
relationship; it generally does not apply to the acts of an independent 
contractor. In instances when hospitals exercised substantial control 
over the acts of their nonemployee physicians,84 however, courts have 
81. See supra Part II. A. 
82. 	 See BARRY R. FuRRow ET AL., HEALTH LAw 312 (1995): 
The liability analysis begins with the control exercised by the plan over its 
physicians . . .. Courts look at the operation of the managed care organization, 
asking whether it "conducts itself in a fashion akin to a health care provider." If 
so, it will be subject to the same liabilities, regardless of its organizational 
structure. 
ld. 
83. See, e.g., Burger Chef Sys., Inc. v. Govro, 407 F.2d 921, 925 (8th Cir. 1969); 
Thompson v. Travelers Indem. Co., 789 S.W.2d 277, 278 (Tex. 1990); Shell Petroleum Corp. 
v. Magnolia Pipe Line Co., 85 S.W.2d 829, 832 (Tex. Ct. App. 1935). During the first half 
of the twentieth century, courts gave hospitals immunity from the application of this 
doctrine, based in part on the charitable purposes of the institutions and in part on the 
notion that hospitals merely provided sites in which physicians could treat their patients. 
By 1957, however, a New York court noted that the hospital's growing role in providing 
health care and in supervising its staff, as opposed to simply providing a venue for 
independent physicians to practice medicine, required reconsideration of the charitable 
immunity doctrine for hospitals. See Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957). 
Although the court noted that the doctrine originally evolved out of the fear that the 
imposition of liability would do irreparable financial harm to the charitable hospital, it 
concluded that there was 
no reason to continue their exemption from the universal rule of respondeat 
superior. The test should be, for these institutions, whether charitable or profit· 
making, as it is for every other employer, was the person who committed the 
negligent injury-producing act one ofits employees and, if he was, was he acting 
within the scope of his employment. 
ld. at 8. 
84. 	 See Furrow, supra note 60, at 87: 
If the contract gave the hospital substantial control over the doctor's choice of 
patients or if the hospital furnished equipment, many courts have found a master­
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imposed vicarious liability on hospitals.85 An employer need not 
exercise actual control over its employees; rather, whenever an employer 
possesses "the right, power, or authority" to exercise control over the acts 
ofits employees, courts have held that imposing liability on the employer 
is proper.86 
In both hospital and MCO settings, physicians experience some 
constraints affecting utilization and quality assurance.87 Because 
HMOs arguably exercise less control over their physicians than a 
hospital might exercise, however, liability under a theory of respondeat 
superior remains more difficult to establish. In light of this control test, 
the vicarious liability of MCOs for the torts of their physicians will 
depend a great deal on the structure of the organization. Staff model 
HMOs are most susceptible to vicarious liability because they directly 
employ their physicians.88 In addition to the general degree of control 
servant relationship. As hospitals expand their quality assurance activities over 
all physicians, the control test may be sufficiently elastic to cover independent 
contractors, further limiting agency law protection for hospitals. 
[d. Courts have considered several factors in determining hospital liability, including: (1) 
"[t]he degree of control exercised by the hospital over the physician"; (2) "the method of 
payment by the hospital to the physician"; and (3) "ownership of the instrumentalities used 
to deliver care-such as the facility itself and the medical equipment." Bearden & 
Maedgen, supra note 15, at 300; see also David J. Oakley & Eileen M. Kelley, HMO 
Liability for Malpractice of Member Physicians: The Case of [PA Model HMOs, 23 TORT 
& INS. L.J. 624,627·29 (1988); Michael Kanute, Comment, Evolving Theories ofMalpractice 
Liability for HMOs, 20 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 841, 848-49 (1989). 
85. See Kober v. Stewart, 417 P.2d 476 (Mont. 1966) (holding hospital liable for doctor's 
malpractice when contract demonstrated that hospital hired doctor as supervisor); Mduba 
v. Benedictine Hosp., 384 N.Y.S.2d 527 (App. Div. 1976) (holding hospital liable for doctor's 
failure to give blood to patient when hospital guaranteed doctor's salary and controlled his 
practice); Berel v. HCA Health Servs., 881 S.W.2d 21, 23-24 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (noting 
that quality assurance activities might be enough to conclude that a hospital exercised 
control over an independent contractor physician, thereby allowing vicarious liability to 
apply to the hospital); cf. Martell v. St. Charles Hosp., 523 N.Y.S.2d 342, 352 (Sup. Ct. 
1987) (holding that contractual relationship between hospital and physician should not 
determine hospital's liability). 
86. See GEORGE D. POZGAR, LEGAL AsPECTS OF HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION 206 (6th 
ed.1996). 
87. See Bearden & Maedgen, supra note 15, at 300-01; Oakley & Kelley, supra note 84, 
at 626-28. 
88. See Sloan v. Metropolitan Health Council, 516 N.E.2d 1104 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987). 
In this case, a staffmodel HMO attempted to avoid liability by claiming that its physicians 
practiced medicine independently and that it exercised no control over their judgments. 
Plaintiffs sued the HMO, alleging that one of its physicians was negligent in failing to 
diagnose plaintiff's condition. See id. at 1105-06. The court rejected the corporate practice 
of medicine defense, holding that "[t]he circumstances establish an employment 
relationship where the employee performed acts within the scope of his employment." [d. 
at 1109. The court carefully considered the structure of the HMO, emphasizing that the 
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exercised by an HMO or other MCO over its physicians, factors such as 
the method of compensation of the physician,89 the ownership of 
instrumentalities used to deliver health care to patients,90 and the 
language used in contracts and other guidelines can be used to evaluate 
the existence of an employer-employee relationship.91 
A few courts have recognized "an expanded notion of accountabilitym 
in rejecting independent contractor defenses asserted by managed care 
organizations.93 In Dunn v. Praiss,94 for instance, a New Jersey 
appellate court held a group model HMO vicariously liable for the 
malpractice of one of its physicians.95 The court pointed to several 
factors that supported finding an agency relationship, including the 
capitation payments to the group, the physicians' use of the HMO's 
facilities in delivering care to enrolled patients, and the HMO's control 
over referrals to the physicians.96 In Raglin v. HMO Illinois, Inc.,97 
participating physicians had signed a contract that was designated as an "employment 
contract" and that the physicians were compensated on a salary basis and had agreed not 
to practice outside the HMO. See id. at 1105. Most significantly, the HMO's medical 
director was given the final authority in matters of dispute between the participating 
physicians and the HMO under the terms of the contract. See id. About 11% of HMOs 
now employ their own physicians. See Furrow, supra note 60, at 80. 
89. See Bearden & Maedgen, supra note 15, at 301 (noting that capitation payments 
resemble salaries more than do fee-for-service payments). 
90. See id. at 301-02. In nonstaffmodel HMOs, the participating physicians maintain 
separate offices and the HMO therefore has less control over the facilities and equipment 
used to deliver care. By comparison, physicians in hospitals use hospital-owned and 
maintained equipment; therefore, in the nonstaff model HMO context, a physician is less 
likely to appear to a patient to be an HMO employee. See id. 
91. See id. at 302 (suggesting that contractual language between the HMO and the 
enrollee that places the HMO in the position of preapproving physician recommendations 
for hospitalization or testing, for example, might support a finding that the HMO has 
sufficient control to justify imposing liability). 
92. See Furrow, supra note 60, at 87. 
93. See Decker v. Saini, No. 88-361768 NH, 1991 WL 277590, at *4 (Mich. Cir. Ct., 
Sept. 17, 1991) ("[I]mposing vicarious liability on HMOs for the malpractice of their 
member physicians would strongly encourage them to select physicians with the best 
credentials. Otherwise, HMO's [sic] would have no such incentive and might be driven by 
economics to retain physicians with the least desirable credentials, for the lowest prices."). 
94. 606 A.2d 862 (N.J. App. Div. 1992). 
95. See id. at 872. Plaintiff sued the HMO and the treating physician, among others, 
alleging that the physician committed malpractice in failing to diagnose cancer in plaintiffs 
deceased husband. The group model HMO in which the physician practiced maintained 
offices where the physician treated HMO patients although the physician apparently 
practiced independently as well. In addition, the physician's urology practice group 
contracted to provide services to the HMO. See id. at 865. 
96. See id. at 868. 
97. 595 N.E.2d 153 (m. App. Ct. 1992). 
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however, an Ill~nois court found that no actual or apparent agency 
relationship existed between the IPA model HMO and its physicians.98 
Instead, the court held that the physicians were independent contractors 
of the HMO based on the structure of the organization. 99 Thus, the 
applicability of vicarious liability will depend on the court's assessment 
ofthe particular arrangement between a managed care organization and 
its physicians. 
C. Ostensible Agency 
The doctrines of ostensible agency and agency by estoppel provide 
other vehicles through which courts can impose liability on MCOs for the 
torts of their participating physicians. In contrast to the vicarious 
liability cases, courts may find the organization liable in these situations 
even if the treating physician is clearly an independent contractor. The 
Restatement (Second) of Torts describes "ostensible agency" as follows: 
One who employs an independent contractor to perform services for 
another which are accepted in the reasonable belief that the services 
are being rendered by the employer or by his servants, is subject to 
liability for physical harm caused by the negligence of the contractor 
in supplying such services, to the same extent as though the employer 
were supplying them himself or by his servants. IOO 
Thus, this doctrine focuses on the patient's expectations as to the source 
of treatment. Courts have used two factors to evaluate the patient's 
expectations: (1) whether the patient looks to the institution, in this 
case the MCO, rather than the individual physician for treatment, and 
(2) whether the institution "holds out" the physician as its employee.101 
A related, but stricter, theory of liability, "apparent agency" or "agency 
98. See id. at 155-56. 
99. 	 See id. at 158. The court stated: 
Nor do we see any basis for finding that [the HMO] advertised or held itself out 
as exerting control over its physicians so that one might reasonably conclude that 
the physicians were the employees of[the HMO]. In fact, the subscriber certificate 
... specifically informed [the plaintiftl that [the HMO] did not directly furnish 
medical care and could not make medical judgments. 
1d. 
100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429 (1965). 
101. See FuRRow, supra note 82, at 294; see also Allred & Tottenham, supra note 72, 
at 474·75 (suggesting a variety offactors relevant to imposing vicarious liability through 
ostensible agency, including whether a patient received treatment at a hospital by a 
physician not selected by the patient and whether the hospital directly billed the patient 
for the services of its treating physicians). 
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by estoppel," requires that a plaintiff prove actual and justifiable 
reliance on the representations of the institution.102 
Courts commonly apply these doctrines in the cases alleging negli­
gence in the delivery of emergency room services or by independent 
contractors working at a hospita1.103 Whether an HMO or other 
managed care organization will be found liable under an ostensible 
agency theory will depend on the nature and extent of that organiza­
tion's representations about the quality of the services delivered. MCOs 
that promote themselves in a manner suggesting that they have 
significant control over the behavior of their participating physicians 
may find it difficult to defend successfully against malpractice claims 
under the ostensible agency theory. 
Commentators have suggested that HMOs include clear statements in 
their promotional materials identifying their physicians as independent 
contractors,104 but even this approach may not preclude liability if the 
plaintiff can show detrimental reliance on the organization itself to 
maintain the quality of care delivered by its physicians. For example, 
in Boyd v. Albert Einstein Medical Center/os a Pennsylvania court 
considered the application of ostensible agency doctrine to an IPA model 
HMO. The court cited a number of factors suggesting that the HMO 
held itself out as a provider of health care, including the fact that the 
HMO employed detailed screening mechanisms for its participating 
physicians and required physicians to comply with extensive HMO 
regulations, and that the subscriber paid fees directly to the HMO, 
selected physicians from a limited list, and could not visit a specialist 
102. The Restatement (Second) ofAgency describes the doctrine of agency by estoppel 
as follows: 
One who represents that another is his servant or other agent and thereby causes 
a third person justifiably to rely upon the care or skill of such apparent agent is 
subject to liability to the third person for harm caused by the lack of care of skill 
of the one appearing to be a servant or other agent as if he were such. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1958). In a few cases, courts have required that 
the plaintiff aver that he would have refused treatment if he had known that the treating 
physician was independent of the hospital. See, e.g., Gasbarra v. St. James Hosp., 406 
N.E.2d 544 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979). 
103. Hospitals commonly utilize independent contractors such as radiologists and 
anesthesiologists. See, e.g., Strach v. St. John Hosp. Corp., 408 N.W.2d 441 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1987); Kober v. Stewart, 417 P.2d 476 (Mont. 1966); White v. Methodist Hosp. S., 844 
S.W.2d 642 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). 
104. See Bearden & Maedgen, supra note 15, at 317; see also Raglin, 595 N.E.2d at 158 
(holding that HMO avoided apparent agency liability by specifically stating to patients that 
it did not provide medical services). 
105. 547 A.2d 1229 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). 
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without permission from the HMO.I06 The court concluded that the 
subscriber could reasonably believe that the HMO provided the care and 
that, therefore, a jpry could find that the HMO, as well as the treating 
physician, committed malpractice. 107 
D. 	 The Constraints of ERISA Preemption 
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA")l06 contains 
a broad preemption clause that provides that ERISA's provisions 
supersede all state laws to the extent that they "relate to" any employee 
benefit plan. loo ERISA covers employee health plans, including those 
administered by HMOs and other managed care organizations. no For 
example, ERISA preempts state law claims based on an MCO's refusal 
to provide reimbursement for services,111 and it probably also will 
preempt claims of misrepresentation, fraud and deceit, and unfair and 
deceptive trade practices. The disclosure provisions of the federal 
106. See id. at 1232-35. 
107. See id. at 1235 ("In our opinion, because [the patient] was required to follow the 
mandates of HMO and did not directly seek the attention of the specialist, there is an 
inference that [the patient] looked to the institution for care and not solely to the 
physicians .... "); see also Decker, 1991 WL 277590 at *3 (holding an IPA model HMO 
liable under ostensible agency principles because, although the HMO argued that it was 
merely acting as an insurer rather than a health care provider, its advertising promised 
the "best care" available); cf. Williams v. Good Health Plus, Inc., 743 S.W.2d 373,378 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 1987) (concluding that nothing in the record supported plaintiffs claim that the 
HMO held itself out as a provider of medical care). 
108. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001­
1461 (1994». 
109. See id. § 514(a) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994». A state law is considered 
to "relate to" an employee benefit plan if it falls into one of four categories: 
First, laws that regulate the type of benefits or terms of ERISA plans. Second, 
laws that create reporting, disclosure, funding, or vesting requirements for ERISA 
plans. Third, laws that provide rules for the calculation of the amount of benefits 
to be paid under ERISA plans. Fourth, laws and common-law rules that provide 
remedies for misconduct growing out of the administration of the ERISA plan. 
National Elevator Indus. v. Calhoon, 957 F.2d 1555, 1558-59 (10th Cir. 1992); see also Pilot 
Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1987). 
110. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994) (defining an employee benefit plan as any plan or 
fund "established or maintained by an employer ... for the purpose of providing for its 
participants or their beneficiaries ... medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits"). The 
only significant exception to ERISA preemption is the "savings clause," which states that 
"nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any 
law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities." [d. § 1144(b)(2)(A). 
However, the statute's "deemer clause" limits the savings clause by prohibiting states from 
deeming an employee benefit plan to be an insurer, bank, trust, or investment company 
in order to implement the savings clause. See id. § 1144(b)(2)(B). 
111. See, e.g., Makar v. Health Care Corp., 872 F.2d 80 (4th Cir. 1989). 
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statute preempt state laws that conflict With these requirements.112 
Persons injured under plans covered by ERISA may receive only 
restitution and equitable relief for benefits improperly denied under the 
plan; punitive damages generally are not available. 113 ERISA also 
includes certain barriers to tort litigation, particularly a requirement 
that aggrieved members exhaust all administrative remedies in the plan 
for disputes about the denial of benefits.1l4 
The vast majority of MCOs qualify as employee benefit plans under 
ERISA. A broad reading of the phrase "relate to" in the preemption 
provision would grant managed care entities protection from most state 
law tort claims. Widespread immunity for MCOs and utilization review 
organizations ("DROs") via complete ERISA preemption would leave 
physicians solely liable for medical malpractice in many cases.115 
Recent decisions suggest a narrower reading of the preemption clause, 
at least with regard to claims based on vicarious liability theories, thus 
leaving MCOs open to tort claims that do not "relate to" an employee 
benefit plan. 
HMOs have successfully used ERISA preemption as a defense in 
medical malpractice claims based on direct corporate liability. Courts 
generally agree that direct liability claims based on, for example, 
rationing decisions made by plan administrators "relate to" the plan and 
thus are preempted.1l6 In addition, courts have held that, when a 
112. See, e.g., Degan v. Ford Motor Co., 869 F.2d 889 (5th Cir. 1989); FuRROW ET AL., 
supra note 82, at 329 (describing ERISA preemption). 
113. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). 
114. See BENDA & RowvSKY, supra note 51. at § 6.1 n.2. 
115. See Robert Pear, H.M.O.'s Using Federal Law to Deflect Malpractice Suits, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 17, 1996, at A24 (describing the federal government's concern that complete 
ERISA preemption could produce the "absurd" result of depriving consumers of the right 
to sue for injuries caused by HMO negligence). 
116. See, e.g., Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan, 999 F.2d 298, 303 (8th Cir. 1993) 
(holding wrongful death action against HMO for utilization review decision that allegedly 
led to patient's death preempted under ERISA); Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 
F.2d 1321, 1339 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding state tort action for wrongful death of unborn child 
against HMO, for failing to allow hospital stay for mother during end of high-risk 
pregnancy, preempted by ERISA); Thomas-Wilson v. Keystone Health Plan East HMO, 
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 454, *9 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 1997) (holding state law claims for 
punitive damages, loss of society, income and earning power, and breach of contract 
preempted by ERISA); DeArmas v. Av-Med, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 816, 817-18 (S.D. Fla. 1994) 
(holding that ERISA preempted claim relating to negligence in administration of health 
plan but did not preempt vicarious liability action against plan for the negligence of its 
physicians); cf. Lars Noah, Reconceptualizing Federal Preemption of Tort Claims as the 
Government Standards Defense, 37 WM. & MARy L. REv. 903, 913-38 (1996) (discussing the 
emerging judicial recognition of preemption defenses under a number of federal safety 
statutes). 
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managed care plan wrongly informs a physician about covered plan 
benefits, this activity "relates to" the plan. ll7 ERISA preemption is 
less certain, however, in cases of indirect negligence such as in vicarious 
liability claims against HMOs. us Under an ostensible agency theory, 
for example, the plaintiff claims that the MCO is liable for its physi­
cian's negligence because of the relationship that exists between the 
physician and the organization. Courts have split on the issue of ERISA 
preemption of vicarious liability claims; a number of courts recently have 
held that ERISA does not preempt such tort claims because they do not 
"relate to" benefits provided under the employee benefit plan, concluding 
instead that the physician negligently provided the benefits received by . 
the employee under the plan.119 Other courts, however, have ruled 
that ERISA preempts claims based on vicarious liability theories.120 
Careful consideration of the preemption issue in several recent cases 
suggests that MCOs will be more vulnerable in the future to certain 
types of claims that fall outside of ERISA's preemptive scope. Courts 
have begun to read the preemption provisIon in conjunction with the 
purpose of the statute as a whole to decide where to draw the line. As 
the United States Supreme Court recently explained, the "basic thrust 
of the pre-emption clause ... was to avoid a multiplicity of regulation in 
117. See, e.g., Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1332·34 (holding that ERISA preempted plaintiffs 
claim that the utilization review organization wrongly denied payment for prenatal care 
and resulted in death ofinfant); see also Laura H. Harshbarger, ERISA Preemption Meets 
the Age of Managed Care: Toward a Comprehensive Social Policy, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
191, 198 (1996) (criticizing the results of ERISA preemption of direct liability claims). 
118. The Third Circuit, reviewing two cases consolidated on appeal, held that ERISA 
did not preempt vicarious liability claims against the HMOs for the alleged malpractice of 
participating physicians. See Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 353·54 (3rd Cir. 
1995). 
119. See, e.g., PacifiCare of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151, 155 (10th Cir. 
1995); Prihoda V. Shpritz, 914 F. Supp. 113, 117·18 (D. Md. 1996) (holding that when the 
issue is the quality of services provided, not whether benefits were provided under the 
plan, ERISA did not preempt a vicarious liability suit against the HMO); Jackson V. 
Roseman, 878 F. Supp. 820,825 (D. Md. 1995); Haas V. Group Health Plan, Inc., 875 F. 
Supp. 544, 548 (S.D. Ill. 1994); Kearney V. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 182, 185·86 
(E.D. Pa. 1994); see also Seema R. Shah, Comment, Loosening ERISA's Preemptive Grip on 
HMO Medical Malpractice Claims: A Response to PacifiCare of Oklahoma V. Burrage, 80 
MINN. L. REV. 1545, 1560·63 (1996) (discussing approaches to ERISA preemption in 
malpractice claims). 
120. See, e.g, Jass V. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482, 1493 (7th Cir. 
1996) (reasoning that, because plaintiffs vicarious liability claim required the court to 
determine the relationship between the HMO and the physician provider, the court would 
be required to examine the terms of the plan itself and that the claim was thus 
preempted); Butler V. WU, 853 F. Supp. 125 (D.N.J. 1994); Ricci v. Gooberman, 840 F. 
Supp. 316, 317 (D.N.J. 1993); Altieri V. CIGNA Dental Health, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 61 (D. 
Conn. 1990). 
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order to permit the nationally uniform administration of employee 
benefit plans."121 The Court concluded that "a law operating as an 
indirect source ofmerely economic influence on administrative decisions 
. . . should not suffice to trigger pre-emption. "122 When a plaintiff 
seeks to recover damages based' on allegedly negligent delay in rendering 
care due to cost-containment restrictions, another court has explained 
that preempting such a claim would be "diametrically opposed to 
ERISA's general purpose of protecting the rights of a plan's beneficia­
ries."123 Several other decisions have indicated that many tort claims . 
based on vicarious liability do not "relate to" the administration of 
pension plans or other employee benefits plans and that suits based on 
such theories are therefore not preempted by ERISA. 124 To the extent 
that ERISA preemptio~ of state law claims against MCOs appears to be 
narrowing, the accompanying increase in successful lawsuits against 
MCOs may leave these organizations scrambling to absorb costs without 
sacrificing quality care. 
Iv. CONSEQUENCES OF EXPANDING TORT LIABILITY 
The common law ofmanaged care organization liability has developed 
as a patchwork of unpredictable standards that vary from one jurisdic­
tion to the next and that are quite difficult to apply. Some proposed tort 
reforms would improve the uniformity and predictability of the law,125 
121. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. 
Co., 115 S. Ct. 1671, 1677-78 (1995). 
122. ld. at 1680; see also California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham 
Constr., N.A., 117 S. Ct. 832 (1997) (holding that California's wage law does not "relate to" 
employee benefit plans and is thus not preempted by ERISA). 
123. Pappas v. Asbel, 675 A.2d 711, 716 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996); see also McClellan v. 
Health Maintenance Org., 604 A.2d lO53 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (holding suit based on 
liability of HMO for negligence of agent-physician and on intentional representation or 
fraud by HMO itself not preempted by ERISA); DeGenova v. Ansel, 555 A.2d 147 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1988) (holding suit based on vicarious liability of HMO for the negligence of its 
agent-physician not preempted by ERISA). 
124. See, e.g., Kearney v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. Pa. 1994) 
(holding that ERISA preempts plaintift's direct negligence claim but not plaintift's vicarious 
liability claim); Elsesser v. Hospital of the Phil. College of Osteopathic Medicine, 802 F. 
Supp. 1286 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (holding that ERISA does not preempt claim against an HMO 
for negligence in selecting and retaining plaintift's primary care physician); Independence 
HMO, Inc. v. Smith, 733 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding that ERISA does not 
preempt medical malpractice claims brought against HMOs under theory of vicarious 
liability). 
125. Florida Governor Lawton Chiles recently vetoed a bill that would have permitted 
subscribers to sue HMOs directly for refusing to provide covered services that an HMO 
doctor says are medically necessary. See Florida H.B. No. 1853 (Reg. Session 1996). 
Governor Chiles noted that, although the potential for HMOs to deny care is troubling, 
1246 MERCER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48 
but it appears that the costs of these reforms to health care organiza­
tions would remain prohibitive. Although patients may benefit from an 
organizational liability approach,126 the imposition of tort liability on 
managed care organizations has some negative consequences, including 
reduced cost containment, increased adverse selection, and interference 
with physician autonomy. 
A. Reduced Cost Containment 
The erratic development of malpractice law has created an unpredict­
able compensation system for patients and has placed an enormous 
financial burden on managed care organizations.127 In addition to 
resources consumed in litigating such cases, evidence suggests that 
enterprise liability may increase the volume of claims filed, creating an 
overall increase in health care CI; . .tS.12S The insistence on the best 
available care for every patient continually drives up costs; eventually 
MCOs will either charge impossible premiums or cease operations 
altogether. Holding MCOs directly liable for. the effects of reasonable 
cost-containment strategies or indirectly liable for physician malpractice 
will further increase costs. To counteract these pressures, policymakers 
might consider granting statutory immunity to all or at least certain 
classes of MCOs. 
Managed care organizations, HMOs in particular, have experienced 
solvency problems of different sorts in recent years. Some states have 
adopted statutes that attempt to stabilize the financial status of HMOs 
or have established guaranty funds to which all HMOs must contribute 
to protect the subscribers of those plans that go bankrupt. l29 None of 
permitting these disputes to be resolved in the already overcrowded court system would 
"threaten to gut concepts at the heart of managed care: keeping costs down by cutting 
down on unneeded services." Gov. Chiles Vetoes Bill Letting People Sue HMOs, GAINES­
VILLE SUN, May 29, 1996, at 4B. 
126. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. For a succinct discussion of the merits 
and different permutations of pure enterprise liability, including organizational enterprise 
models, see Furrow, supra note 60, at 109-24. 
127. See Furrow, supra note 60, at 133 (Appendix). 
128. See Edelen v. Osterman, 943 F. Supp. 75, 77 (D.D.C. 1996) (commenting on "the 
burgeoning HMO industry and the legions of potential HMO-related medical malpractice 
claims that can be brought by innumerable HMO participants"); see also Allred & 
Tottenham, supra note 72, at 541 (noting that patients are more likely to sue MCOs than 
their individual physicians); Furrow, supra note 60, at 131. 
129. See Allred & Tottenham, supra note 72, at 513-14 (discussing statutes governing 
financial solvency of integrated delivery systems); Marc A. Rodwin, Managed Care and 
Consumer Protection: What Are the Issues?, 26 SETON HALL L. REv. 1007, 1024-25 (1996) 
(noting that 1995 legislation proposed in Congress would exempt provider-sponsored 
networks from state insurance regulations designed to protect the financial stability of 
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these approaches, however, directly addresses the problems created by 
the imposition of organizational liability for medical malpractice. If one 
accepts the reality that rising costs now prevent unfettered patient 
access to all medically-beneficial care, it seems equally apparent that the 
legal system must tolerate rather than hamper cost-containment efforts 
by managed care organizations. To promote the efficient utilization of 
resources, MCOs should not fear civil liability for the effects of reason­
able cost-containment measures or the malpractice of their physicians. 
To the extent that cost-containment measures require policing, 
legislatures and regulators can more effectively establish and maintain 
reasonable limits than can the courts.· Administrative agencies can 
supervise MCOs, allowing these organizations to build regulatory 
constraints into their risk management and cost-containment activities. 
Tort law, in contrast, is unsuited to the task of policing cost-contain­
ment measures because it focuses on identifiable cases of managed care 
negligence while sacrificing the overall efficiency of the managed care 
system.130 As highlighted in Part III of this Article, different attempts 
to modify tort law to address the conflict between rationing health care 
resources and maintaining quality care have created a partial and 
largely unsatisfactory solution. None of the approaches discussed 
effectively limits MCO liability to those extreme cases most deserving of 
compensation. Instead, each new theory of organizational liability risks 
opening the floodgates to suits of varying merit, which drain the 
resources of the organizations. lSI To encourage further market-based 
MCOs); FuRROW ET AL., supra note 27, at 718-19. Other states have passed legislation 
requiring all provider contracts to contain "hold harmless" clauses that protect employers 
and subscribers against claims from unpaid providers in the case of financial difficulties 
with the MCO. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111112, para. 1407.01, § 2-8(a) (1995). 
130. Cf. Lars Noah, The Imperative to Warn: Disentangling the "Right to Know" from 
the "Need to Know" About Consumer Product Hazards, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 293, 375 (1994) 
("Courts in particular seem oblivious to the overall effect of their many decisions regarding 
the need to warn of individual and often trivial risks."). 
131. One of the most interesting models under consideration is the American Law 
Institute's ("ALI") proposed "channelling" model, which would channel liability to the 
institution and treat physicians as part of the enterprise with no separate liability and 
without otherwise significantly altering the rules of proof. Under such a plan, injured 
patients could easily identify the source of their injuries, legal costs would be lowered with 
a single defendant, insurers would be able to predict risk more accurately, physicians 
would be relieved of their constant fear of malpractice suits, and institutions could use 
their centralized data collecting abilities to minimize future risks. See ALI REPORTERS' 
STUDY, 2 ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY: APPROACHES TO LEGAL AND 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 111 (1991). Under some proposed enterprise liability reforms, 
experts predict that the rate of lawsuits will increase significantly. Patients are more 
willing to sue their managed care organization than their personal physician at the outset. 
Proposed no-fault systems raise the largest concerns about increased suits. Twenty years 
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reforms of the health care system, either the legislature or the courts 
must remove tort law from the calculus.132 
B. Increased Adverse Selection 
Organizational liability may lead MCOs to seek other effective 
methods for reducing their expenses. One of the more obvious approach­
es is to increase adverse selection against higher risk enrollees. Such 
liability encourages providers to avoid covering high risk patients or 
patient groups through a variety of adverse selection techniques 
including patient and geographical profiling.l33 In particular, patients 
with chronic illnesses may find it more difficult to procure insurance 
through an HMO than through traditional indemnity plans. 
One recent study compared data on privately insured, noninstitution­
alized patients under age sixty-five to test this adverse selection theory. 
The results were equivocal. The study found surprisingly little variation 
in the overall prevalence of the fifteen studied chronic conditions among 
insureds in HMOs and indemnity plans, but significantly more patients 
with two common chronic conditions had insurance through indemnity 
plans.134 For another common condition, HMOs covered a larger 
number of patients than indemnity plans.131i Although this study 
suggests that HMOs do not discriminate against chronically ill patients 
at the present time, adverse selection may well increase as suits against 
ago, a California study estimated that a no-fault insurance system in California could 
increase malpractice premiums by 300% over the tort system then in place. See 
CALIFORNIA MED. Ass'N & CALIFORNIA Hosp. Ass'N, REPORT ON THE MEDICAL INSURANCE 
FEASIBILITY STUDY (Don H. Mills ed., 1977). 
132. See supra note 125 (discussing rationales offered by Gov. Chiles for recently 
vetoing a Florida bill that would have permitted subscribers to sue HMOs directly for 
refusing to provide covered services that an HMO doctor says are medically necessary) . 
. 133. See Furrow, supra note 60, at 130. 
134. See Teresa Fama et al., Do HMOs Care For the Chronically Ill? , HEALTH AFF., Spr. 
1995, at 234, 237-39 (concluding that, for arthritis, 81.7% ofpatients were covered through 
indemnity insurance compared with 68% in HMOs and, for hypertension, 79.4% ofpatients 
had indemnity insurance compared with 71.1% in HMOs); cf. George Anders, Quality of 
Care for Poor and Elderly at HMOs Is Questioned in New Study, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 1996, 
at B5. In a four year study comparing HMO and fee-for-service care and focusing on 
elderly and poor patients with chronic disease, surveyors found that 54% of elderly 
respondents in HMOs reported a decline in health during the study period, compared with 
28% of the elderly in fee-for-service plans; and 33% of poor, chronically ill HMO patients 
reported a decline in health compared with only 5% in fee·for-service plans. Critics of the 
study urged caution in drawing negative conclusions from its results, noting that reports 
were based solely on patient self·assessment and that only a small population of patients 
was surveyed. See id. 
135. See Fama, supra note 134, at 237-39 (concluding that, for patients with asthma, 
46.2% were insured through indemnity plans while 57% received care from HMOs). 
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managed care organizations become more common and impose greater 
costs. 1b the extent that statutes attempt to prevent such discrimina­
tion/36 MCOs will have to bear the costs associated with tort liability. 
C. Interference With Physician Autonomy 
The threat of organizational liability may tend to increase organiza­
tional interference with the MCO physicians' practice of medicine. ls7 
Physicians already complain that HMOs and other MCOs micromanage 
their treatment decisions and that the current system of financial 
incentives conflicts with their traditional role as patient advocate. ISS 
Statutory limitations on the amounts and types of these incentives would 
help to limit MCO manipulation of medical decisionmaking by partici­
pati)1g physicians, and statutory immunity from tort liability would 
remove one of the incentives for this type of manipulation. 
Physicians may contend that an MCO's influence over their practice 
decisions inappropriately interferes with their ability to deliver quality 
care, but at least one court has sharply refused to accept such interfer­
ence as an excuse for poor judgment on the part of the physician. In 
136. For example, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-191, 100 Stat. 1936 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300gg-1 - 300gg-92 (West 
Supp. 1997», requires health insurers to make their policies available to anyone who has 
had health insurance (and who meets other requirements of the Act) and requires insurers 
offering dependent coverage to enroll dependents of insured persons without waiting 
periods or preexisting condition exclusions provided that these dependents are enrolled 
within 30 days of birth, adoption, or marriage. In addition, health insurers must accept 
those who had group health insurance but can no longer get it, provided that the insured 
has exhausted COBRA continuation coverage and has at least 18 months of prior health 
insurance coverage. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-41. 
137. See Furrow, supra note 60, at 128. 
138. Direct or vicarious managed care liability also will tend to foster another form of 
perceived interference with physicians' autonomy, the now pervasive use of information­
gathering to evaluate performance. Medical organizations maintain databases that track 
physician credentials and performance in detail, and health networks can use this data to 
hire those physicians who have the best track records and are least likely to cause patient 
iJijuries. See id. at 126. Obviously, this type of "interference" with autonomy is desirable 
from the patient's perspective and will likely become more common under various 
enterprise liability reform proposals, as health plans seek to improve quality and reduce 
the incidence of patient iJijuries. However, data suggesting that a physician falls "below 
average" may have a serious negative impact on the physician's career and on the liability 
of the MCO that employs him or her. See id. at 126-28 ("Any enterprise liability proposal 
is likely to reduce physician autonomy and subject them to constant evaluation of their 
practice techniques and patient outcomes."). Clearly, from patients' perspective, more 
available information about physicians is better, and there would be no reason to limit the 
gathering of (or access to) such information, even if MCOs receive statutory immunity. 
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Varol u. Blue Cross & Blue Shield,l39 the court expressed impatience 
with a group of physicians who claimed that the threat of withheld 
payment for services under utilization review procedures might influence 
them improperly and unfairly to render what they perceived as less than 
the ideal treatment. l40 Similarly, the court in Wickline noted that 
treating physicians had a duty to appeal to the state payor if they 
believed the proposed care was medically insufficient, and it reproved a 
physician for failing to attempt to protest the payor's decision to 
discharge his patient from the hospital prematurely. 141 The court 
emphasized that the physician "cannot point to the health care payor as 
the liability scapegoat when the consequences of his own determinative 
medical decisions go sour."142 It seems reasonable to hold physicians 
ultimately responsible for their patients' care so long as the particular . 
MCO's incentives or utilization review procedures do not unduly 
constrain them in providing reasonable care. Extending tort liability to 
managed care organizations may have the perverse effect of increasing 
their interference with physician autonomy. 
V. ALTERNATIVES TO MANAGED CARE LIABILITY 
The competing concerns of quality health care and cost containment 
create a significant challenge for managed care. The added fiscal 
pressures arising out of potential tort liability may further handicap 
these organizations' attempts to meet the challenge. Health care 
providers and policymakers seem increasingly willing to consider 
alternatives to liability as they recognize the associated difficulties faced 
by managed care organizations in striving to deliver quality care at a 
reasonable cost. Permitting MCOs to assert cost constraints as a defense 
to liability or granting total immunity from suit to these organizations 
139. 708 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. Mich. 1989). 
140. The court reminded the complaining physicians that, "[w]hether or not the 
proposed treatment is approved, the physician retains the right and indeed the ethical and 
legal obligation to provide appropriate treatment to the patient. Thus, there is no direct 
interference with the physician-patient relationship nor in the treatment rendered." [d. 
at 833 ("Plaintiffs are saying in effect, 'Since I am weak in my resolve to afford proper 
treatment, [Blue Cross and Blue Shield's] preauthorization program would induce me to 
breach my ethical and legal duties, and the Court must protect me from my own weak­
ness.'"). 
141. See Wickline v. California, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 819 (Ct. App. 1986) ("There is little 
doubt that [the physician] was intimidated by the Medi-Cal program but he was not 
paralyzed by [its] response nor rendered powerless to act appropriately ifother action was 
required under the circumstances."). 
142. [d. But see Jonathan J. Frankel, supra note 66, at 1306 (arguing that it was 
reasonable for the physician in the Wickline case to believe that the public payor for his 
indigent patient's care had some authority to direct the nature and duration oftreatment). 
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under certain circumstances may represent the most sensible solution to 
the pressing problems of access and quality. 
A. Cost as a Defense to Liability 
Although some commentators have argued that the existing standard 
of care is flexible enough to accommodate the conservative approach to 
medical practice of managed care organizations,l43 courts have not 
demonstrated any willingness to embrace this view. In response, some 
commentators have suggested permitting physicians and provider 
organizations working under severe financial constraints to rebut the 
presumption of a uniform standard of care by asserting a cost de­
fense-by claiming that they were financially unable to provide the care 
required with the resources available to them. l44 Under this proposal, 
the physician would have to demonstrate a heavy fiscal burden (based 
on severely limited resources in the hospital) and would further have to 
prove that no alternatives to the substandard treatment were readily 
available.145 
The cost defense should be distinguished from the locality rule, which 
allows a court, in defining the standard of care, to consider or account 
for limited resources available in an isolated rural community.l46 The 
cost defense differs from the locality rule in that it seeks to address 
instead the problem of resource variations within the same city or region 
that become apparent when an indigent or uninsured patient is denied 
useful, available treatment because of its cost. This situation is beyond 
the reach of the locality rule. 147 
This proposed cost defense seems ideally suited to application in the 
managed care context. A managed care entity must justify the criteria 
143. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text. 
144. See E. Haavi Morreim, Cost Containment and the Standard of Medical Care, 75 
CAL. L. REV. 1719, 1757 (1987) (suggesting that, although the law presumes that 
physicians owe all patients a unitary standard of care regardless of the individual patient's 
financial resources, a physician may rebut this legal presumption under certain 
circumstances). 
145. See id. at 1757-58. Professor Morreim emphasizes that she is not proposing to 
require the physician to demonstrate that he or she pursued every possible opportunity on 
the patient's behalf: "If the law required the physician to treat each patient as an 
exception to the otherwise applicable cost guidelines, it would in effect demand that he 
systematically ignore costs." [d. at 1758. 
146. See id. at 1730 (describing the example of a physician who fails to order a CAT 
scan for a patient because there is no CT scanner within reasonable travelling distance, 
and explaining that, under the locality rule, courts will not hold that phYSician to have 
deviated from the standard of care even though a CAT sean would ordinarily be required 
under the national standard). 
147. See id. 
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under which it agrees to provide a particular treatment or procedure as 
adequate medical practice in the face of significant economic restrictions. 
Then, the defendant organization must prove that the individual 
patient's condition fits these guidelines and that no reason existed to 
provide an exception to the rule. l48 Under these circumstances, a cost 
defense appears to provide a potential solution to the quandary faced by 
managed care organizations and their participating physicians. 
Fundamental tort principles of fairness and reasonableness support 
recognition of a cost defense. Managed care represents a response to the 
reality of finite health care resources. Treatments that may seem 
appropriate under bountiful circumstances become less justifiable when 
resources are limited, because the effect of allocating resources to a 
particular patient indirectly affects other patients within the system as 
well.149 However, no court has yet explicitly accepted a cost defense to 
a medical malpractice lawsuit, and commentators have argued that, 
when faced with a disagreement about the medical necessity of a 
treatment, courts will inevitably balance the equities in a way that 
favors compensating plaintiffs over protecting insurers against financial 
loss. 150 
B. Contractual Waivers and Disclosure 
Incorporating waivers of the patient's right to sue the organization in 
the initial enrollment contract provides another avenue for limiting the 
potential liability of MCOs for actions in tort or breach of contract. 
Arbitration clauses represent one type of waiver. Arbitration provisions 
offer significant advantages for MCOs, including lower payments for 
damages and resolution of disputes without setting precedent, as well as 
swifter claims resolution and reduced administrative costs. 151 More 
148. .See id. at 1758. 
149. See id. at 1759; see also Robert C. Macaulay, Jr., Health Care Cost Containment 
and Medical Malpractice: On a Collision Course, 21 SUFF. U. L. REV. 91, 118 (1986) ("To 
enable cost containment to serve the public interest in maintaining affordable health care, 
payors should not be subject to tort liability in connection with cost containment in the 
absence of intentional wrongdoing or gross negligence."). 
150. See Mark A. Hall & Gerald F. Anderson, Health Insurers' Assessment ofMedical 
Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637, 1655 (1992) (citing Dozsa v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 
716 F. Supp. 131, 140 (D.N.J. 1989». Professors Hall and Anderson describe the tendancy 
of courts, in evaluating prospective utilization review, to "assume the worst-case, life-or­
death scenario prior to treatment: that the patient will certainly die without the requested 
treatment and that the treatment will definitely save the patient's life." Id. 
151. See Stanley D. Henderson, Contractual Problems in the Enforcement ofAgreements 
to Arbitrate Medical Malpractice, 58 VA. L. REv. 947, 997-98 (1972) (concluding that, "once 
widespread use of malpractice arbitration develops, the incidence of enforcement will 
depend primarily on whether the arbitration clause is viewed as representing actual 
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sweeping contractual waivers might deny patients any right to 
compensation through either litigation or arbitration. To withstand 
judicial scrutiny, the contractual waiver should include full disclosure to 
the potential enrollee of all financial incentives, both to participating 
physicians and to the organization itself, to ration care. Without the 
enrollee's informed consent to these financial incentives, a contractual 
waiver of the right to sue arguably would be invalid. Even with full 
disclosure, courts must grapple with the disparity in bargaining power 
between the patient and the health plan. 
Courts have permitted employers to bind the employee group to 
arbitration without expressing concern that the resulting agreement is 
a contract of adhesion. For example, in Madden v. Kaiser Foundation 
Hospitals,152 the court upheld an arbitration clause, rejecting concerns 
over disparity in bargaining power (which had caused courts to reject 
waivers of liability in other medical care settings) because the employer­
payor negotiated the HMO group contract.15S The opinion expressed 
little concern, at least in the case of health care contracts negotiated by 
an employer for the benefit of and with input from employees, about the 
contractual requirement of using an alternative forum for dispute resolu­
tion.154 Some courts have demonstrated a willingness to uphold 
agreement or a unilateral decision by the medical industry"); see also Barry Meier, In Fine 
Print, Customers Lose Ability to Sue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1997, at AI, C7 (discussing 
increasing prevalence of arbitration clauses in a variety of consumer contexts, including 
health care). 
152. 552 P.2d 1178 (Cal. 1976). 
153. 	 See id. at 1185. 
The Kaiser plan ... represents the product of negotiation between two parties ... 
possessing parity of bargaining strength. Although plaintiff did not engage in the 
personal negotiation of the contract's terms, she ... benefitted from representation 
by a board, composed in part of persons elected by the affected employees, which 
exerted its bargaining strength to secure medical protection for employees on more 
favorable terms than any employee could individually obtain. 
Id.; see also Branham v. CIGNA Healthcare, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 3395 (Aug. 6, 1996) 
(holding that state employee was properly bound by the arbitration clause negotiated with 
a health plan on her behalO, app. granted, 674 N.E.2d 374 (Ohio 1997). 
154. See Madden, 552 P.2d at 1180 ("[P)rinciples pertaining to adhesion contracts ... 
do not apply to the arbitration provision in this case, ... providing merely for a forum for 
enforcement of the rights of the enrolled employees rather than a substantive limitation 
of them."); see also Dinong v. Superior Court, 162 Cal. Rptr. 606,610 (1980); cf. Tunkl v. 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 447 (Cal. 1963) (holding hospital-patient 
contract releasing hospital from future liability as a condition of patient admission invalid 
on grounds that the contract provision affected the public interest and "manifested the 
characteristics of the so-called adhesion contract"); Colorado Permanente Medical Group, 
P.C. v. Evans, 926 P.2d 1218, 1226 (Colo. 1996) (refusing to enforce binding arbitration 
clause when arbitration provision did not comply with state statute governing such 
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binding arbitration agreements in MCO contracts even under circum­
stances that clearly suggest abuse of the process by the organization.155 
Requiring disclosure of financial incentives, cost-containment 
measures, and contractual tort immunity to MCO patients at the time 
of enrollment would enable patients to make informed, well-considered 
choices about the quality and quantity of care they will receive in 
exchange for a lower premium.l56 Patients can, in effect, consent to a 
more conservative style of medical practice, including restricted choice 
of physicians and noncoverage of certain services, than they would 
receive in a traditional fee-for-service plan. Courts have not, however, 
imposed a duty on MCOs to disclose financial incentives and have been 
reluctant to consider causes of action for negligent physician decision­
making attributable to such incentives.157 Instead, a number of recent 
agreements). 
155. See, e.g., Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc., 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621, 646-47 
(Ct. App.), review granted, 905 P.2d 416 (Cal. 1995). In this case, the appellate court 
reversed the trial court's refusal to enforce the binding arbitration clause in a group 
medical contract. The arbitration program was designed and administered by Kaiser, and 
the fact that Kaiser (and not a neutral entity) administered the program was not disclosed 
to subscribers in the contract. See id. at 626. The court noted that, although the 
arbitration provisions required the appointment of a neutral arbitrator within 60 days of 
a request for arbitration, on average this first step in the process took 674 days. See id. 
at 629. Nonetheless, the court concluded that the actions of Kaiser in delaying the 
arbitration process were not sufficient to set aside the agreement: "While some or all of 
this conduct may have been improper under statutes that regulate lawyers' actions ... , 
and morally reprehensible if undertaken by Kaiser and its attorneys simply to stall the 
litigation until the claimant died, it is not the stuff of which a claim of fraud is made." [d. 
at 640. 
156. Disclosure issues also contain an embedded informed consent question. As one 
commentator has noted, physicians, in obtaining informed consent to treatment, often bear 
"the burden of explaining the details of the plan's operation" to the patient. Alice C. 
Gosfield, The Legal Subtext ofthe Managed Care Environment: A Practitioner's Perspective, 
23 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 230, 232 (1995). 
In addition to explaining gatekeeping, prior authorizations for services, and the 
inability to obtain coverage outside the network of providers, physicians must also 
confront informed consent. When the plan does not offer a benefit that the 
physician would recommend in other circumstances, what is his or her obligation 
to reveal the options that are not covered? There is no clear legal answer to this 
question. 
[d. Once the subscriber has already joined the plan, the physician inherits a task that 
more properly belongs to the MCO at the time of enrollment. See Wendy K. Mariner, 
Business v. Medical Ethics: Conflicting Standards for Managed Care, 23 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 236, 242 (1995) ("If a subscriber is validly to consent to join a health plan (and to 
be bound by its terms), then the MCO-the entity with the relevant information-should 
have a duty to disclose all information relevant to the subscriber's decision."). 
157. See Madsen v. Park Nicollet Medical Ctr., 419 N.W.2d 511, 515 (Minn. Ct. App.) 
(holding that a profit motive that may have influenced a physician not to hospitalize a 
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state legislative proposals contain disclosure provisions similar to those 
found in the American Medical Association's 1994 Model Patient 
Protection Act ("MPPA"), and these provisions would require detailed 
disclosure to patients of their health plan's terms and contracts with its 
providers.15s Thorough disclosure at the time of enrollment would 
enable patients to make informed choices and would protect MCOs from 
claims of fraudulent or misleading conduct.159 
C. Statutory Immunities 
The recent upswing in malpractice litigation against MCOs highlights 
some of the problems with recognizing institutional tort liability in this 
field. Both employers and individual subscribers have noted the steady 
increase in the costs of participating in HMOs and other MCO plans, no 
doubt attributable in part to increased liability exposure. The quantity 
oflitigation and the unpredictability of outcomes suggest that the courts 
may not be ideally suited to the task of effectively regulating cost­
containment mechanisms. A few states have granted immunity to MCOs 
in an attempt to preserve these organizations as cost-effective vehicles 
for delivering quality care. Statutory immunity for MCOs, in combina­
tion with careful regulatory monitoring of these organizations, might 
accomplish in a more predictable and orderly fashion what the courts 
have failed to do. 
patient was "only marginally relevant, and potentially very prejudicial" and was therefore 
properly excluded), rev'd on other grounds, 431 N.W.2d 855 (Minn. 1988); Deven C. 
McGraw, Financial Incentives to Limit Services: Should Physicians Be Required to Disclose 
These to Patients?, 83 GEO. L.J. 1821, 1832 (1995). But see Teti v. U.S. Healthcare, 1989 
WL 143274, at *3 (E.D. Pa.) (discussing plaintiffs complaint alleging that the defendant 
HMO's concealment of a "compensation referral fund" from purchasers of health care 
coverage constituted fraudulent nondisclosure in violation of federal law), affd, 904 F.2d 
696 (3d Cir. 1990). The court, however, dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds. 
158. See Platt & Stream, supra note 7, at 493-94. A 1995 Florida bill, modeled on the 
MPPA, 
would have required HMOs and other managed care plans to inform prospective 
enrollees of a plan's coverage proviSions and exclusions, treatment policies and 
any restrictions or limitations on services, prior authorization or review 
requirements, any financial arrangements or contracts a plan has with hospitals, 
physicians or other providers that would limit services, referral or treatment, 
including financial incentives not to provide services. 
Id. at 494 n.38 (discussing Fla. H.B. 841, § 100 (1995». 
159. For example, in Teti, 1989 WL 143274, the plaintiff argued that, had she been 
informed of her health plan's gatekeeping system, she would not have enrolled with the 
insurer. Although the case was dismissed, it generated significant controversy within the 
managed care industry about the extent of an HMO's duty to disclose to subscribers the 
HMO's structural incentives and limitations on access to specialists and other non-primary 
care parts of the system. See Gosfield, supra note 156, at 232 (discussing Teti). 
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A few states have already begun to experiment with statutory 
immunity for HMOs and other managed care organizations. The New 
Jersey legislature concluded that HMOs do not practice medicine and 
exempted these organizations from liability for "negligence, misfeasance, 
nonfeasance or malpractice" in connection with the furnishing of health 
services.ISO The statute explicitly states that courts can. only hold the 
actual provider of health care liable. 161 In Illinois, nonprofit "health 
services plan corporations" that have no affiliation with any hospital 
have statutory immunity fr~m liability for injuries resulting from the 
malpractice of any employee or other person or organization rendering 
health care on behalf of the corporation.162 Colorado immunizes HMOs 
from civil liability under the theory that these organizations "shall not 
be deemed to be practicing medicine. "163 
160. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2J-25(c) & (d) (West 1994). The New Jersey Department 
of Health and Human Services recently promulgated an array of regulations governing 
HMOs and addressing issues of consumer protection, health decisions and access, and 
quality and performance. The regulations provide for a two-step appeal process for denials ' 
of treatment, the right of patients to see specialists for their chronic conditions, and the 
right to information about how HMOs pay their physicians, among other things. See New 
Jersey Announces New HMO Regulations, 1 MEALEy'S LITIGATION RPTS: MANAGED CARE 
No.4 (Feb. 19, 1997), available iTt LEXIS, LegNews library, MEAMC file. 
161. See New Jersey Announces New HMO Regulations, 1 MEALEy's LITIGATION RPTS: 
MANAGED CARE No.4 (Feb. 19, 1997), available in LEXIS, LegNews library, MEAMC file. 
162. 	 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 215, para. 165/26 (1993), provides as follows: 

A health services plan corporation . . . operated on a not for profit basis, and 

neither owned nor controlled by a hospital shall not be liable for injuries resulting 

from negligence, misfeasance, malfeasance, nonfeasance or malpractice on the part 

of any officer or employee of the corporation, or on the part of any person, 

organization, agency or corporation rendering health services to the health 

services plan corporation's subscribers and beneficiaries. 

[d.; see also id. para. 165/2(a) (defining "health services plan corporation"). The state court 
upheld the limited immunity provided for in this statute in the face of a state constitution­
al equal protection challenge. See Jolly v. Michael Reese Health Plan Found., 587 N.E.2d 
1063, 1067 (Ill. 1992) (holding that statutory immunity granted to health care providers 
under the Voluntary Health Services Plans Act does not violate special legislation and 
equal protection provisions of the Illinois Constitution). 
163. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-16-421(3) (West 1994). The statute defines HMOs 
broadly, including both for-profit and nonprofit organizations. [d. § 10·16-102(23). Courts 
have concluded, under the statute, that breach of contract claims and tort claims may not 
be brought against HMOs. See Evans v. Colorado Permanente Medical Group, P.C., 902 
P.2d 867, 877 (Colo. App. 1995), modified, 926 P.2d 1218 (Colo. 1996); Freedman v. Kaiser 
Found. Health Plan, 849 P.2d 811, 816 (Colo. App. 1992). 
Because an HMO is specifically precluded from practicing medicine, no HMO can 
direct the actions ofthe independent physicians with whom it contracts. Thus, we 
conclude that the concept of respondeat superior cannot be invoked to make an 
HMO responsible for the medical malpractice of those independent contractor 
physicians that it is statutorily precluded from directing or controlling. 
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In Harrell v. Total Health Care, Inc.,lM the Missouri Supreme Court 
considered the constitutionality of a state statute that exempted 
nonprofit "health services corporations" from liability for the negligence 
of physicians rendering services to the organization's members.165 The 
plaintiff belonged to a health services corporation that required members 
to consult a participating primary care physician before being referred 
to a specialist on the organization's approved list of specialists. l66 The 
plaintiff sought to recover damages for an injury sustained during 
surgery performed by one of the organization's specialists, arguing that 
the MCO had breached its duty to use due care in selecting its physi­
cians and specialists and had impliedly warranted the competence of its 
contracting physicians. The trial court granted summary judgment in 
favor of the organization based on the immunity provided for in the 
statute.167 
Although the Missouri statute grants immunity only to not-for-profit 
health services corporations/66 the arguments recognized by the court 
in support of statutory imm~ty apply to any MCO that provides health 
care in exchange for set patient dues with cost-containment as one of its 
goals. Both for-profit and not-for-profit MCOs face insolvency, or at least 
rapidly escalating costs, when they must defend against claims of 
malpractice. According to the court in Harrell, the state legislature 
clearly felt that prepaid health care served the public interest and 
should not be burdened with the ever-increasing costs of malpractice 
litigation. l69 The court also pointed out that plaintiff had adequate 
Sciarretta v. Multi-Specialty Medical, P.C., described in 1 MEALEy's LITIGATION RPTs: 
MANAGED CARE No.1 (Jan. 8, 1997), available in LEXIS, LegNews library, MEAMC file 
(holding that state's corporate practice of medicine statute specifically exempts HMOs from 
malpractice liability). 
164. 781 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 1989). 
165. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 354.125 (Vernon 1991) ("A health services corporation shall 
not be liable for injuries resulting from neglect, misfeasance, ma,feasance or malpractice 
on the part of any person, organization, agency or corporation rendering health services to 
the health services corporation's members and beneficiaries."). 
166. See Harrell, 781 S.W.2d at 59. 
167. See id. at 59-61. 
168. See id. at 60; see also MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 354.010(4) & 354.025 (requiring not-for­
profit status to be eligible for statutory immunity, and granting immunity to eligible health 
services corporations, whether providing health care directly or reimbursing for services 
provided by others). 
169. See Harrell, 781 S.W.2d at 61 ("The legislature might easily perceive that the costs 
of [malpractice claims] ... would necessarily be shared by other plan members, and that 
malpractice liability might threaten the solvency of the plan."). "Just as the ancient 
Chinese are reputed to have paid their doctors while they remained well, a person may 
elect to pay fixed dues in advance so that medical services may be available without 
additional cost when they are needed." ld. 
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recourse for her injuries against the physicians who actually committed 
the malpractice and cannot complain that she may not also sue the 
nonprofit organization that facilitated the delivery of the negligent 
services.170 
In lieu of such a limited patchwork of state statutes, Congress should 
consider legislation protecting managed care organizations. A federal 
statute immunizing MCOs would have to contain provisions designed to 
ensure an adequate standard of care at the organizational level. Under 
a statutory immunity plan, MCO subscribers would retain their right to 
sue participating physicians for malpractice. Because certain managed 
care practices can result in indirect injury to patients, however, 
organizational immunity from liability is only justifiable if granted in 
conjunction with regulations that protect patient welfare by preventing 
MCOs from imposing overly stringent cost controls. 
Some states have already enacted statutes or promulgated regulations 
limiting the ability of HMOs and other health care organizations to 
assume risk through insurance contracts.l71 The federal government 
also has begun to regulate financial incentives for physicians who 
participate in plans that provide care for Medicare and Medicaid 
recipients, prohibiting "specific" payments directly or indirectly to 
physicians "as an inducement to reduce or limit medically necessary 
services."172 If a plan uses financial incentives to put physicians at 
substantial financial risk,173 then it must provide "stop-loss protection" 
for the plan physicians based on standards developed by the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services ("HHS").174 Stop-loss protection limits 
the amount of financial risk borne by an MeO's physicians. HHS 
finalized implementing regulations in 1996,175 and these rules do not 
include capitation payments, bonuses, or fee withholds as "specific" 
payments within the meaning of the statute. Although the regulations 
170. See id. at 61-62 (The statute "does not deny the plaintiff a remedy for the wrong 
done to her. She has her right of action against the negligent surgeon. The statute simply 
limits her access to an additional pocket."). 
171. See BENDA & RozovsKY, supra note 51, at § 13.6. 
172. 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm(i)(8)(A)(i) (1994). 
173. See id. § 1395mm(i)(8)(A)(ii) (requiring the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services to define substantial financial risk). 
174. 	 See Orentlicher, supra note 28, at 162 n.28: 
For example, in an expanded capitation plan in which the capitation payments are 
designed to cover all patient costs, physicians might only be responsible for patient 
costs up to a maximum of $5,000 or $10,000 for anyone patient .... There might 
also be a cap on the total amount of costs for which the physicians are responsible. 
175. See 61 Fed. Reg. 69,034, 69,049 (1996) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 417 & (34). 
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permit these types of incentives, they restrict the amount of financial 
risk that the health plan may shift to the participating physicians.176 
A similar approach could encompass all MCOs regardless of participa­
tion in Medicare or Medicaid. Physicians would bear the risks of a 
plan's cost containment to a limited extent, but if the plan's financial 
incentives put more than twenty-five percent of the physician's income 
at risk (for example), then the MCO would lose its immunity from suit 
for the results of its cost-containment measures. To protect patients 
further, incentive payments should be calculated on an annual rather 
than a monthly basis to allow for variations in the cost of treating a 
group of patients from one month to the next. Similarly, the legislation 
should base physician incentives on large patient groups to achieve a 
reasonable average cost of overall treatment.177 Capitation arrange­
ments, fee-withholds, bonuses, quotas, and similar arrangements should 
be designed or set at reasonable levels to reflect industry averages. 
Regulations also might prohibit certain cost-control arrangements 
outright. 
Statutes governing the structure and financial incentives used by 
MCOs that have been granted tort immunity also might include 
requirements such as salaries for physicians, which have the effect of 
guaranteeing the physicians' incomes and separating those incomes from 
treatment decisions made for individual patients.178 Diluting the risk 
of capitation payments by spreading capitation funds and costs across 
large physician populations might provide another safeguard for patient 
welfare.179 Finally, these statutes might require that MCOs give 
physicians significant input into utilization review and quality assurance 
guidelines.lso 
176. The regulations define substantial financial risk as existing when financial 
incentives involve the risk of more than 25% of the physician's income, but only if the 
incentives are based on a patient threshold of 25,000 or fewer patients. See id. at 69,049. 
Once a patient group exceeds 25,000, a HCFA study determined that health care costs did 
not vary significantly and that therefore risks could be spread effectively. Thus, in these 
larger patient populations, the regulations do not limit the degree of risk that can be 
shifted to the plans' physicians. See id.; see also Orentlicher, supra note 28, at 163-64 
(detailing HCFA's earlier stop-loss regulations). 
177. See Orentlicher, supra note 28, at 195-96 (also suggesting audits to detect patterns 
of substandard care and financial penalties against physicians for inappropriate care). 
178. See id. at 226-27. 
179. See id. at 227; see also Joan B. Trauner & Julie S. Chesnutt, Medical Groups in 
California: Managing Care Under Capitation, HEALTH .AFT., Spr. 1996, at 159 (noting that 
many larger physician organizations have turned to in-house processing of claims and 
tracking of referrals and hospital admissions in order to maintain their incomes in the face 
of little or no recent increases in capitation payments). 
180. See Christensen, supra note 18, at 227. 
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Regulations also might specify utilization review procedures designed 
to protect patient interests, particularly with regard to denials of 
coverage. For example, some commentators have suggested that only 
physicians specializing in the relevant medical specialty should make the 
final decision to deny coverage for a treatment and that the reviewer 
should be required to consult with the patient's physician. In addition, 
regulations should provide for an expeditious appeal procedure, and 
patients should receive immediate notification of coverage denials and 
assistance with appeals.1Sl The federal government is considering 
regulations to protect Medicare beneficiaries who receive care from 
HMOs. Although HCFA has not yet issued proposed rules, the 
regulations evidently will include a seventy-two hour limit for resolving 
most appeals in cases when members' lives are at stake and the right to 
appeal decisions to reduce, terminate, or completely deny coverage.1S2 
As an alternative to a general grant of tort immunity to all ~pOs, a 
legislature might consider drawing distinctions between different 
categories ofMCOs and granting immunity only to particular categories. 
For example, one commentator has identified several important. 
differences between for-profit and nonprofit MCOs that might provide 
grounds for determining whether or not to grant statutory immunity to 
a particular class of managed care organization.l83 For-profit plans 
have higher administrative costs than nonprofit MCOs because for­
profits trade their shares publicly, pay high salaries and bonuses to 
CEOs, and pay dividends to shareholders.l84 Because nonprofit MCOs 
devote a higher percentage of income to health services, for-profits 
presumably feel a greater need to limit health services costs and may 
rely more heavily on financial incentives to physicians to limit care.1S5 
181. See Allred & Tottenham, supra note 72, at 463-64. For suggested contractual 
language regarding appeals, see id. at 532 n.542. 
182. See George Anders & Laurie McGinley, HMO·Medicare Recipients to Get Broader 
Rights, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 1997, at B2 (reporting that HMOs currently have as long as 
60 days to resolve complaints, even when patient lives or their ultimate return to health 
is at stake). 
183. See Christensen, supra note 18, at 223. 
184. See id.; see also KAREN DAVIS ET AL., HEALTH CARE COST CONTAINMENT 142 (1990) 
(noting that the percentage of for-profit MCOs out of total MCOs grew from 18% in 1982 
to 67% in 1988). 
185. See Christensen, supra note 18, at 223 ("It stands to reason that physicians in an 
MCO that has both less to spend on patient care and stockholders to please will be under 
more pressure to cut corners."). A recent study identified a comparable distinction between 
not-for-profit and for-profit hospitals. See Robert Pear, In Separate Studies, Costs of 
Hospitals Are Debated, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1997, at C2 (noting that for-profit hospitals 
spend significantly more on administration than nonprofit hospitals, and describing a 
recent study that concluded that for-profit hospitals "'save money by laying oifnurses, then 
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A system that grants immunity from tort liability to MCOs requires 
regulations to ensure that these organizations maintain reasonable cost­
containment strategies to protect patient welfare. In addition, the use 
of any cost-containment arrangements also requires that someone make 
the health care rationing decisions that arise in these arrangements. 
Although a number of commentators have criticized the use of physicians 
as rationing' decisionmakers,186 in a system where MCOs enjoy tort 
immunity, physicians' would be most effective in making these deci­
sions,187 and further, they must remain involved in the rationing 
process' to protect themselves from individual liability. In contrast, 
MCOs will find it virtually impossible to develop guidelines for making 
individual rationing decisions.186 By controlling MCOs' use of financial 
incentives and other cost-containment measures and by placing the 
actual rationing decisions in the hands of physicians, the proposed 
syste~. can effectively accomplish its twin goals of keeping costs down 
and protecting patient welfare. When medical error occurs, the victim 
of malpractice has recourse against the treating physician in whose 
'hands the ultimate responsibility of maintaining the standard of care 
rests. Regulations limiting MCO cost-containment measures thus would 
protect both the patient and the treating physician while allowing MCOs 
and patients to reap the benefits of lower health care costs. 
Realistically, courts and legislatures must acknowledge the effects of 
financial measures on physicians. The proposed statutory immunity 
discussed here would insulate physicians from liability for their plans' 
cost-containment policies to the extent that the regulations permit the 
policies. Of course, this does not address the problem of physicians' 
hire consultants and bureaucrats to ... maximize revenues'''). 
186. See, e,g., Norman G. Levinsky, The Doctor's Master, 311 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1573 
(1984); Robert M. Veatch, DRGs and the Ethical Allocation ofResources, HAsTINGS Cm. 
REP., June 1986. at 32,37-39. But see Mark A. Hall, Rationing Health Care at the Bedside, 
69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 693, 727-58 (1994) (rejecting the view that physicians should not make 
rationing decisions when treating patients); Orentlicher, supra note 28, at 167-73. 
187. See Orentlicher, supra note 28, at 168-69 (noting that it is virtually impossible for 
nonphysicians to develop rationing guidelines. that the development and implementation 
of such guidelines are difficult to separate, and that health care plans cannot develop 
guidelines with sufficient specificity to be of much use to physicians). 
188. 	 See id. at 170-71. 
[B]ecause specific guidelines cannot be created, and general rationing principles 
will always be indeterminate for particular rationing decisions, the development 
and implementation of rationing guidelines must occur as intertwined endeavors. 
As a corollary, because each patient's circumstances are unique, every time 
physicians decide whether or not to provide a medical service, they are essentially 
both creating and implementing a new rationing policy. 
[d. 
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moral or professional obligations to treat when noncovered treatments 
are medically necessary. The proposal would relieve physicians of legal 
liability in these instances but would sometimes leave them in an ethical 
dilemma. 
D. Ethical Implications and Mass Justice 
Managed care provides basic health care that meets the needs of the 
vast majority of enrollees. Nonetheless, a few patients requiring 
extraordinary measures not covered under the plan will suffer from the 
unavailability of certain treatments. Is it ethical to encourage patients 
to enroll in plans that provide less than the full panoply of medically 
beneficial care to keep premiums, and thus health care, within the reach 
of a larger population? By their very nature, MCOs pose issues of this 
sort, but a decision to grant malpractice immunity to these organizations 
would place these issues in even starker relief. Critics have expressed 
concerns about the failure of HMOs to meet the needs of the atypical 
patient, but some have recognized that permitting physicians to retain 
significant autonomy in making patient care decisions can counter this 
problem to some extent. lS9 
In fact, some commentators have suggested that patients who opt for 
lower-cost MCO plans rather than expensive fee-for-service policies 
receive financial rewards for their cost-consciousness. l90 Under that 
approach, patients also might receive financial incentives to keep the 
costs of routine care low and utilize preventive care, such as childhood 
vaccinations and pap smears, that could obviate the need for higher cost 
care in the future. 191 In this era of growing patient autonomy, proper­
ly informed patients may reasonably decide to forego medical care of 
little or no utility in exchange for lower health plan premiums. l92 
189. See id. at 175-76 ("If physicians are given broad latitude in allocating health care 
resources, they can individualize the care, taking into account the particular needs and 
circumstances of each patient."). 
190. See Alain Enthoven & Richard Kronick, A Consumer-Choice Health Plan for the 
1990s: Universal Health Insurance in a System Designed to Promote Quality and Economy 
(pt. I), 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 29, 33 (1989); E. Haavi Morreim, Redefining Quality by 
Reassigning Responsibility, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 79,99-100 (1994); E. Haavi Morreim, The 
Ethics of Incentives in Managed Care, 10 TRENDS HEALTH CARE L. & ETHICS 56, 59·60 
(1995). 
191. See Orentlicher, supra note 28, at 186-87 (discussing financial incentives for 
patients). 
192. See id. at 187 ("If patients are able to reject health care because they do not like 
physical side effects or simply because they no longer want to live, they should also be able 
to reject health care because it is not worth its cost."). 
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Immunizing MCOs for the torts of their physicians and for the effects 
of their cost-containment measures contemplates a kind of mass justice 
that may trouble some observers, but that approach is far from unique 
in the American legal system.193 The workers' compensation system, 
for example, arose in the first half of this century in response to the 
difficulties that employees encountered in suing their employers for 
employment-related injuries.194 Although the injured employees 
generally do not receive full compensation, the system provides a 
reliable, predictable, and relatively speedy response to workplace 
IDJuries. Similarly, the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act195 
represents a carefully considered response to the ballooning liability once 
faced by manufacturers ofvaccines, which threatened to bankrupt them 
and make these important products unavailable.l96 
<..")t; VI. CONCLUSION 
Managed care organizations provide patients with comprehensive, 
coordinated health care in a cost-efficient setting with an emphasis on 
preventive care and controlling costs. MCOs seek to maximize the 
availability of scarce health care resources while avoiding cost increases 
that would make these services financially inaccessible. Achieving a 
balance between cost containment and quality care becomes more 
difficult as lawsuits against MCOs proliferate. Holding MCOs liable for 
193. See, e.g., JERRY L. MAsHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 222 (1983) ("[B]ureaucratic 
rationality . . . is a promising form of administrative justice. It permits the effective 
pursuit of collective ends without inordinately saCrificing individualistic or democratic 
ideals."). 
194. See generally ORIN KRAMER & RICHARD BRIFFAULT, WORKERS COMPENSATION: 
STRENGTHENING THE SOCIAL COMPACT 13-27 (1991) (noting that employers routinely and 
successfully raised defenses such as contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the 
fellow-servant doctrine and that the alternative to a no-fault worker's compensation statute 
was the judicial erosion ofthese tort defenses in the employment context, out of recognition 
of the unfairness of these doctrines when applied in such circumstances). The judicial 
approach, however, would have negatively impacted both injured employees and employers; 
employees would have had to grapple with unpredictable trial outcomes and long delays 
in recovery of compensation, and employers would have likewise shouldered the burden of 
frequent litigation, unpredictable risks, and, at times, disproportionately high levels of 
compensation for workplace injuries from sympathetic juries. See id. 
195. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-l - 300aa-34 (1994). 
196. The Act created a compensation fund by imposing a manufacturer's excise tax on 
vaccines. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 4131, 9510 (1994). The Act allows manufacturers to predict the 
degree of their liability, thereby encouraging research, development, and continued 
manufacturing of needed products. See Shalala v. Whitecotton, 115 S. Ct. 1477, 1478-80 
(1995) (describing operation of statute); Lisa J. Steel, Note, National Childhood Vaccine 
Injury Compensation Program: Is This the Best We Can Do for Our Children?, 63 GEO. 
WASH. L. REv. 144 (1994). 
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the effects of cost-containment measures defeats the purpose of these 
organizations. Perhaps it is more realistic to view the operation of 
MCOs from a mass justice perspective: the philosophy of cost contain­
ment seeks to provide adequate health care to the vast majority of the 
patient population even though a few patients will suffer injury from 
lack of access to state-of-the-art medicine. 
Recipients of health care provided directly or facilitated by MCOs may 
genuinely have reason to complain about the quality of care received. 
MCOs undoubtedly restrict patient choice of health services, and in some 
instances, relieving MCOs of liability based on these restrictions will 
lead to an unwise or unfair result. But regulatory officials rather than 
the courts may address these concerns more effectively. Providing 
statutory immunity for MCOs relieves these organizations of the 
uncertainty and financial burden of contending with malpractice claims, 
leaving the organizations free to focus on providing quality care at a 
reasonable cost. State and federal legislators and regulatots can 
effectively balance the competing interests of MCOs and health care 
recipients by establishing minimum standards of coverage for health 
insurance policies while immunizing MCOs from liability for the torts of 
their physicians and for the effects of legal cost-containment measures. 
Physicians must retain the ultimate responsibility for their patients' 
welfare, and a system that acknowledges this responsibility while 
limiting organizational influences over treatment choices may provide 
the most effective balance of quality care and cost containment. 
